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VOLUME 59 SUMMER 1985 NUMBER 4
ORGANIZATIONS CLASSIFIED AS
CORPORATIONS FOR FEDERAL TAX
PURPOSESt
WILLIAM J. RANDS*
The purposes of this paper are to define what is and what is
not a corporation for federal tax purposes; to discuss the judicial
responses to arguments made by either the government or tax
counsel that, for tax purposes, a corporation should be disregarded,
or at least treated merely as an agent of its shareholders; to evalu-
ate the jurisprudential quality of some of the positions taken in the
cases, the regulations, and the revenue rulings; and to make some
tax planning recommendations. These taxpayer identity issues are
important not only for the jurisprudence they have generated,
which is substantial, but also because their resolution produces
radically different tax treatment for closely held enterprises and
their owners - the taxpayers primarily affected by the resolution of
these issues.1 Hence, the focus of this article is upon this group of
taxpayers.
t Copyright 1985 by William J. Rands.
* Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati College of Law; J.D., Tulane University;
member of Arkansas and Louisiana Bars.
I Courts have emphasized how keenly they will scrutinize arrangements between closely
held enterprises and their owners. See, e.g., Red Carpet Car Wash, Inc. v. Commissioner, 73
T.C. 676, 685 (1980) (ownership status of partnership interest denied when no capital con-
tribution or other activity with regard to partnership found); Strong v. Commissioner, 66
T.C. 12, 24 (1976) (corporation's purpose of avoiding usury laws and activities of borrowing
money and mortgaging property deemed sufficient to require recognition as separate entity),
aff'd mem., 553 F.2d 94 (2d Cir. 1977).
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THE CORPORATION AS AN INDEPENDENT TAXABLE ENTITY
Subject to exceptions 2-notably corporations complying with
the requirements of Subchapter S3-a corporation, unlike a part-
nership or proprietorship, is an independent taxpaying entity, sep-
arate and distinct from its shareholders.4 It computes its own in-
come, deducts its own losses, files its own return, and pays its own
tax.5 It is not required to account for the income of its sharehold-
ers, and it is not allowed to deduct losses of its shareholders from
its income. Correlatively, its shareholders are neither required to
account for the income of the corporation nor allowed to deduct
the corporation's losses from their personal income. Despite the
universal acceptance of these apothegms, the government or a tax-
payer occasionally claims that a particular corporation should be
disregarded for tax purposes or, at least, for a particular group of
transactions. 6 The courts, however, ignore the separate existence
of corporations only in exceptional circumstances." In general,
courts recognize rather than disregard the corporate entity." "The
2 See, e.g., I.R.C. § 318(a)(3)(C) (1985) (if shareholder owns 50% or more in value of
stock of one corporation, in certain circumstances he may be deemed constructive owner of
shares in another corporation owned by his corporation).
3 Id. § 1363(a). Subchapter S, added to the Code in 1958, permits certain close corpora-
tions to be taxed as if they were individual proprietorships or partnerships, with earnings
and losses passed through to the shareholders. Thus, the Subchapter S corporation receives
the tax benefits of a partnership while maintaining benefits of corporate form. See id.; S.
REP. No. 1983, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 87 (1958); Coven & Hess, The Subchapter S Revision
Act: An Analysis and Appraisal, 50 TENN. L. REV. 569, 571 (1983); Lang, Subchapter S
Revision Act of 1982: Dealing With Transitional Rules, 60 TAxES 928, 931 (1982).
" New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435, 442 (1934). I have addressed the
unique characteristics of a corporation's separate identity in a previous article:
Every business lawyer assuredly at one time or another has repeated to a cli-
ent the antediluvian maxim that a primary advantage of the corporate form is
that the corporation is vested with the capacity of continuous succession, irrespec-
tive of changes in its membership. If the shareholder dies, his shares pass to his
successor. If he transfers his shares, the transferee becomes the shareholder in his
stead. These changes do not affect the existence or the identity of the corporation
as a legal unit. As long ago proclaimed by Blackstone, a corporation is "a person
that never dies: in like manner as the River Thames is still the same river, though
the parts which compose it are changing every instant."
Rands, Closely Held Corporations: Restrictions on Stock Transfers, 84 Com. L.J. 461, 461
(1979) (quoting 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 468 (1969)).
See I.R.C. §§ 11, 172, 1201, 6012(a)(2) (1985).
6 See, e.g., Moline Properties, Inc. v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 436, 436 (1943) (taxpayer
claimed that corporation should not be recognized); Patterson v. Commissioner, T.C.M. (P-
H) 5 66.236 (1966) (government claimed corporation should be ignored).
7 Britt v. United States, 431 F.2d 227, 233 (5th Cir. 1970).
8 See id. at 233. A corporation will retain its separate identity as long as its purpose is
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doctrine of corporate entity," the Supreme Court declared in a fa-
mous corporate tax opinion, "fills a useful purpose in business
life."'
DISTINCTIVE TAX RULES FOR CORPORATIONS
The Internal Revenue Code applies distinctive rules to corpo-
rations; 10 imposes the notorious system of double taxation on cor-
porate income,11 and provides special tax rules for transactions be-
tween corporations and their shareholders. 12 Although detailed
enumeration of these various rules is unwarranted here, it is never-
theless noteworthy that the stakes in classification controversies
can be enormous. For example, a real estate venture is likely to
produce large deductions for its owners in the early years of its
development.13 If the organization owning the venture is classified
as a partnership, these deductions are passed through to the part-
ners who can use them on their personal returns to shelter their
income from other sources. 4 Indeed, the sheltering effect of these
deductions often is a prime inducement to investors in real estate
ventures. If an organization is classified as a corporation, however,
these deductions may be permanently lost.15 First, assuming the
corporation does not meet the requirements for Subchapter S sta-
tus, corporate deductions are not passed through to shareholders. 16
Second, while theoretically the corporation itself is entitled to the
tax benefits from its early losses,'17 corporations involved in these
real estate projects often do not have sufficient income against
related to business activity, and business is, in fact, carried on. See Moline Properties, Inc.
v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 436, 438-39 (1943).
9 Moline Properties, Inc. v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 436, 438 (1943).
10 Compare I.R.C. § 1 (1985) (tax rates for noncorporate taxpayers) with id. § 11 (tax
rates for corporations).
11 Corporate income is taxed to the corporation when earned, id. § 11, and any part of
that income that is distributed to shareholders as dividends is taxable to the shareholders,
but not deductible by the corporation, id. §§ 61(a)(7), 301, 316(a).
11 See, e.g., id. § 351 (special rules for transfers of property to controlled corporations
in exchange for stock or securities).
13 See Hoffman, Straw or Nominee Corps. Must be as Passive as Possible to Protect
Investors Deductions, 5 TAX'N FOR LAW. 10, 10 (1976).
14 See I.R.C. § 702 (1985) (a partnership's losses from sale or exchange of capital assets
may be deducted by individual partners in the amount of their distributive share).
15 See Baker & Rothman, Nominee and Agency Corporations: Grasping for Straws, 33
INST. ON FED. TAx'N 1255, 1264 (1975).
"6 See, e.g., id.; Bertane, Tax Problems of the Straw Corporation, 20 ViL. L. Rv. 735,
737 (1975) (property losses of corporation not passed on to shareholders).
'7 See I.R.C. § 172 (1985).
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which the deductions can be applied, either in the year the ex-
penses or losses were incurred or within the permissible time pe-
riod for carrying back or carrying forward corporate net operating
losses.18 Without these deductions, the project might be unattrac-
tive to the investor. With the deductions, the project might be
viewed as an abusive tax shelter to the government. Thus, it is easy
to understand that controversies result because of classification
issues.
DIFFICULTIES IN CLASSIFYING ORGANIZATIONS
Taxpayer identity issues can get quite murky. For example,
many organizations have characteristics of more than one class of
taxpayer. A limited partnership may look as much like a corpora-
tion as a partnership. The limited partners resemble shareholders
in that they are passive investors who do not participate in manag-
ing the affairs of the business.19 They may have the power to trans-
fer interests in the organization freely and without constraint, 0
and sometimes even publicly.21 Limited partners have limited lia-
bility.22 Management of a limited partnership is centralized in the
general partners,23 who might resemble the directors of a corpora-
tion. There may be only one general partner, and that partner may
be a corporation with neither substantial assets of its own nor a
significant proprietary interest in the partnership itself. A close
corporation, on the other hand, may operate like a partnership, a
course of conduct now expressly permitted by some state stat-
18 See Baker & Rothman, supra note 15, at 1264.
'9 See, e.g., UNIF. LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ACT § 7 (1916) (limited partner liable as general
partner only when active in control of the business); REVISED UNIF. LIMITED PARTNERSHIP
ACT § 303(a) (1976) (same). See generally J. CRANE & A. BROMBERG, LAW OF PARTNERSHIP §
26(a) (1968) (limited partnership is result of desire to share profits without management
responsibility and liability for losses); H. REUSCHLEIN & W. GREGORY, AGENCY AND PARTNER-
SHIP § 264 (1979) (limited partners barred from managerial capacity in business); L. RIB-
STEIN, BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS §§ 2.03(1), 3.03.
20 See UNIF. LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ACT § 19 (1916); REVISED UNIF. LIMITED PARTNERSHIP
ACT § 702 (1976).
' See S. REP. No. 9895, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 106 (1983).
" See, e.g., UNI. LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ACT § 7 (1916) (limited partner generally not
liable as general partner); REVISED UNIF. LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ACr § 303(a) (1976) (limited
partner not liable for obligations of limited partnership unless involved in control of busi-
ness); see also J. CRANE & A. BROMBERG, supra note 19, at § 26(a) & (c); H. REUSCHLEIN &
W. GREGORY, supra note 19, at § 264; L. RIBSTEIN, supra note 19, at § 2.03(1).
23 See, e.g., UNIF. LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ACT § 9 (1916); see also J. CRANE & A. BROM-
BERG, supra note 19, at § 26(a); H. REUSCHLEIN & W. GREGORY, supra note 19, at § 264; L.
RIBSTEIN, supra note 19, at § 3.03.
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utes.24 Another organization may be incorporated, but may be not
much more than a sham or dummy.25 Tax counsel or the govern-
ment might for different reasons insist that such a corporate entity
be ignored for federal tax consequences.
The Internal Revenue Code does not provide solutions for any
of these taxpayer identity issues. The Treasury Regulations are the
primary source of rules for classifying unincorporated entities, 26
but they have been the target of extensive criticism.27 Further-
more, the regulations are inapplicable to other taxpayer identity
problems, for example, when to disregard a corporation for tax
purposes, and the problems governed by inconsistent caselaw.2s
THE ROLE OF STATE LAW
The regulations ascribe a preemptive role to federal law in
classifying organizations for federal tax purposes. That is, classifi-
cation issues are governed by federal law, not state law.29 Conse-
quently, a particular organization, considered an unincorporated
association under state law, may be deemed a corporation for fed-
eral tax purposes if it has enough of the corporate characteristics
enumerated in the regulations.30 The regulations concede, however,
that state law is necessary to determine the legal rights of the
members of the organization in meeting the standards of a particu-
lar classification.3 1 For example, one of the corporate characteris-
tics enumerated in the regulations is limited liability for members
24 See, e.g., DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 341, 356 (1974); MD. CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN.
§§ 4-101 to 4-603 (1975); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 620(a)-(c) (McKinney 1963); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 1701.591(F)(1) (1985); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 12.11.1-12.31.2 (Law. Co-op. 1982);
TEy. Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. art. 12.37 (Vernon Supp. 1985). See generally L. RBSTEIN, supra
note 19, at § 3.05(3) (1983); 2 F.H. O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATONS § 1.14(a) (2d ed. 1971).
25 See, e.g., Ogiony v. Commissioner, 617 F.2d 14, 16 (2d Cir.) (income from property
not attributed to shareholder unless corporation is purely passive dummy), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 900 (1980); Love v. United States, 96 F. Supp. 919, 922 (Ct. Cl. 1951) (actions of corpo-
ration determine tax identity even though regarded as "straw," "dummy," or phantom);
Strong v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 12, 21 (1976) (use of sham or dummy corporations recog-
nized New York practice), aff'd mem., 553 F.2d 94 (2d Cir. 1977).
26 See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2 (1985).
27 See Note, Tax Classifications of Limited Partnerships, 90 HARv. L. REV. 745, 856-62
(1977) [hereinafter cited as Harvard Note]; Note, Tax Classification of Limited Partner-
ships: The IRS Bombards the Tax Shelters, 52 N.Y.U. L. REV. 408, 440-41 (1977) [hereinaf-
ter cited as N.Y.U. Note].
28 See infra notes 59-83 and accompanying text.
See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1(c) (1985).
31 See id. § 301.7701-2(a)(3).
$1 See id. § 301.7701-1(c).
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of the organization. 2 Because federal law generally says nothing
about which types of organization provide limited liability for their
members, one must refer to the state law governing a particular
association to determine whether or not its members have limited
liability.
Courts have accepted the preemptive role that the regulations
assign to federal law in classifying unincorporated entities.33 This
does not mean that the courts are pleased with the regulations. In
one controversial Tax Court case involving the tax classification of
a limited partnership, the majority opinion and one dissent lam-
basted the regulations. 4 Though the court felt constrained "to ap-
ply the provisions of respondent's regulations as we find them and
not as we think they might or ought to have been written," 35 the
majority encouraged the government to change them."
The role of state law is much cloudier in cases involving incor-
porated organizations. Prior to 1965, the government consistently
treated entities chartered as corporations under state law and op-
erated in good faith as corporations for federal tax purposes.3 7 The
primary debate centered on proper classification of organizations
not labeled "corporations" by state law. 8 In 1965, the Government
promulgated regulations that were "obviously" intended to prevent
professional associations, for example, of doctors or lawyers, from
obtaining corporation status for tax purposes. 9 The courts, how-
ever, uniformly struck down these 1965 regulations. 40 From this
32 See id. § 301.7701-2(d).
3 See, e.g., Zuckman v. United States, 524 F.2d 729, 733 (Ct. Cl. 1975) (classification of
real estate development determined by regulations); Larson v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 159,
172 (1976) (regulations control over state law classifications).
34 See Larson v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 159, 185-86 (1976); id. at 202, 206 (Quealy, J.,
dissenting).
'5 Id. at 185-86.
6 See id.
7 See United States v. Empey, 406 F.2d 157, 165 (10th Cir. 1969).
3' Bittker, Professional Associations and Federal Income Taxation: Some Questions
and Comments, 17 TAX L. REv. 1, 26 (1961).
39 See United States v. Empey, 406 F.2d 157, 164 (10th Cir. 1969); infra notes 57-58
and accompanying text.
40 See, e.g., Kurzner v. United States, 413 F.2d 97, 112 (5th Cir. 1969) (regulations
struck when challenged by association of Florida physicians); O'Neill v. United States, 410
F.2d 888, 895 (6th Cir. 1969) (successful challenge by Ohio physicians); United States v.
Empey, 406 F.2d 157, 170 (10th Cir. 1969) (professional service corporation of lawyers suc-
cessfully challenges regulations); Smith v. United States, 301 F. Supp. 1016, 1021-22 (S.D.
Fla. 1969) (regulations declared invalid); Van Epps v. United States, 301 F. Supp. 256, 257
(D. Ariz. 1969) (regulations held invalid in attempt to tax professional corporation of physi-
cians); Williams v. United States, 300 F. Supp. 928, 932 (D. Minn. 1969) (regulations de-
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line of authority, which was no more than a response to the outra-
geous 1965 regulations, came a hornbook-sounding maxim: a cor-
poration created under state law is a corporation for federal tax
purposes.41 In contrast to the regulations, this line of authority
made state law paramount,42 because state law, with few excep-
tions, generally controls the procedures for incorporating. If the act
of incorporation is paramount, the federal standards contained in
the treasury regulations are rendered largely irrelevant.
The question in another line of cases was whether, despite
compliance with state law requirements for incorporation, the
court should disregard the corporate entity and look to the share-
holders as being the taxpayers.43 Though the language in these de-
cisions sometimes echoes state law rationales for piercing the cor-
porate veil,44 the federal courts have created a body of common law
tax principles to answer the question.45 In stark contrast to the au-
thority invalidating the 1965 regulations, the courts in these cases
accorded little significance to the act of incorporation. In one case,
it was held that the mere label of "corporation" on an entity did
not control its status for federal tax purposes.46 In a similar case,
the court looked to state law to determine the legal relationships of
the members of the organization, but only for the purpose of test-
ing whether the organization met the federal standards for attain-
ing corporate status.47
It may be possible to harmonize these two apparently incon-
sistent lines of authority. According to the cases invalidating 1965
regulations, the detailed, mechanical rules contained in the federal
clared invalid and inapplicable to association of physicians).
4 O'Neill v. United States, 410 F.2d 888, 899 (6th Cir. 1969); see Kleinsasser v. United
States, 707 F.2d 1024, 1027 (9th Cir. 1983); United States v. Empey, 406 F.2d 157, 170 (10th
Cir. 1969).
42 See, e.g., O'Neill v. United States, 410 F.2d 888, 896, 899 (6th Cir. 1969) (regulations
invalid insofar as they require corporation created under state law to be treated other than
corporation for federal tax purposes).
43 See infra notes 46-50 and accompanying text (discussion of cases in which courts
disregarded corporate entity notwithstanding compliance with state law).
" See Britt v. United States, 431 F.2d 227, 233 (5th Cir. 1970). In Britt, the court
suggested that the government can disregard the corporate entity when the shareholder has
conducted business as if he and the corporation were one and the same. Id. Although the
court rejected this argument, other courts have accepted it in similar contexts. See, e.g.,
Shaw Constr. Co. v. Commissioner, 323 F.2d 316, 319 (9th Cir. 1963) (if corporate form
chosen by taxpayer is sham, it may be disregarded).
45 See infra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
46 See Britt v. United States, 431 F.2d 227, 237 (5th Cir. 1970).
47 See O'Neill v. Commissioner, 271 F.2d 44, 49 (9th Cir. 1959).
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regulations (known as the "Kintner Regulations" and discussed in
depth later)48 are not to be applied to associations incorporated
under state law.49 This proposition would not prevent a court from
disregarding the corporate entity in appropriate circumstances,
which is what the other lines of authority allow courts to do. Thus,
while the norm is to honor the corporate status conferred on enti-
ties by state business corporation acts, the presence of certain un-
usual circumstances-for example, lack of a business purpose for
the corporation-may result in a court disregarding the corpora-
tion as a distinct taxable entity.50
CLASSIFICATIONS OF ORGANIZATIONS - THE CODE
In general, an organization may be classified as an "associa-
tion" (i.e., a corporation), a partnership, a proprietorship, or a
trust. Despite the importance of the classification issue, the Inter-
nal Revenue Code is unusually terse, leaving the delineation of the
law to the courts and the regulations. Section 7701(a)(3), for exam-
ple, defines "corporation" by stating merely that "the term 'corpo-
ration' includes associations, joint-stock companies, and insurance
companies." 51 Section 7701(a)(2) provides a catch-all definition of
the term partnership that includes "a syndicate, group, pool, joint
venture, or other unincorporated organization . ..which is not
a corporation."52 Neither the Internal Revenue Code nor the
Treasury Regulations define the term "proprietorship," which is
generally thought to refer to an unincorporated business operated
by one person in his own right and without an independent organi-
zation separate and apart from himself.5 3 The Code similarly does
not define the term "trust," although the Treasury Regulations
differentiate between "ordinary trusts" and "business trusts." An
ordinary trust is "an arrangement created either by a will or by an
inter vivos declaration whereby trustees take title to property for
the purpose of protecting or conserving it for the beneficiaries
4' See infra notes 67-75 and accompanying text.
49 See, e.g., O'Neill v. United States, 410 F.2d 888, 899 (6th Cir. 1969) (entity treated as
corporation under state law is corporation for federal tax purposes regardless of regula-
tions); United States v. Empey, 406 F.2d 157, 170 (10th Cir. 1969) (regulations which treat
corporation under state law as partnership held invalid).
50 See, e.g., Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469 (1935) (corporate form disregarded
when no bona fide business purpose supports its existence).
I.R.C. § 7701(a)(3) (1985).
52 Id. § 7701(a)(2); see Harvard Note, supra note 27, at 746.
" See L. RIBSTEIN, supra note 19, at §§ 1.01, 1.04.
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under the ordinary rules applied in chancery or probate courts. '
A "business trust" is a trust created by beneficiaries "as a device to
carry on a profit-making business."55 Only an "ordinary trust" is a
"trust" as used in the Internal Revenue Code.56
ORGANIZATIONS CLASSIFIED AS CORPORATIONS - THE REGULATIONS.
Because of the virtual absence of statutory guidelines, the
Treasury Regulations have served as the primary source of rules
governing the classification issue. A product more of adversarial
zeal than of deliberate rule-making, the Regulations represent the
government's persistent efforts to stop a particular tax practice
that, for some reason, has seemed particularly odious to the Com-
missioner: professionals treating their businesses as "associations"
for tax purposes so they can achieve favorable tax treatment for
fringe benefits and deferred compensation plans.5 7 This favorable
treatment has not been available, or at least not as fully available,
to self-employed persons or partnerships.5
At one time it was thought that the imposition of the double
tax on dividends resulted in a heavier income tax burden on corpo-
rations than on unincorporated entities. The approach of the gov-
ernment prior to 1954, therefore, was to classify business entities
as corporations, whenever possible. 9 However, while the Commis-
sioner was building up precedent for this presumption in favor of
corporate classification, Congress was passing laws that gave
favorable tax treatment to corporations that set up deferred com-
pensation plans60 At some point in time, tax advisors began to re-
alize that, for at least some clients, the tax laws for corporations
were more advantageous than those for noncorporate entities. As a
Tress. Reg. § 301.7701-4(a) (1967).
55 Id. § 301.7701-4(b).
56 See id. § 301.7701-4(a), (b).
7 See Fisher, Classification Under Section 7701 - The Past, Present, and Prospects
for the Future, 30 TAX LAw, 627, 627-33 (1977); Note, Tax Classification of Limited Part-
nerships: Opportunity for Reform, 30 RUTGERS L. Rnv. 1260, 1264-65 (1977); see also Eaton,
Professional Corporations and Associations in Perspective, 23 TAx L. Rxv. 1, 18-21 (1967)
(discussing cases challenging 1965 regulations); Scallen, Federal Income Taxation of Profes-
sional Associations and Corporations, 49 MnNN. L. REv. 603, 603-04 (1965) (discussing state
statutes permitting corporate form and Commissioner's classification for tax purposes).
58 See Note, Professional Corporations and Associations, 75 HARV. L. REV. 776, 778-79
(1962).
59 Kurzner v. United States, 413 F.2d 97, 100 (5th Cir. 1969); see Eaton, supra note 57,
at 6.
so Kurzner, 413 F.2d at 101; see Eaton, supra note 57, at 23.
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result, the Commissioner changed his attitude on the classification
issue. He now wanted to narrow the definition of "association" and
exclude the "clamoring welter of associations seeking corporate
status."'" The turnabout it desired was impeded by precedent,
however. The regulations and the cases evinced a conscious incli-
nation in favor of corporate status.2 Such was the stage for the
Kintner decision.
In United States v. Kintner,3 a 1954 decision, a group of doc-
tors convinced the Ninth Circuit that the group's unincorporated
association should be classified as a corporation for federal tax
purposes.6 4 The Kintner result should not have surprised anyone,
given that both judicial and administrative precedent inclined
strongly toward the corporate classification. Incensed that doctors
and other professionals could get the tax benefits of qualified pen-
sion plans, the Commissioner at first refused to follow the Kintner
decision., After several subsequent courtroom defeats, however,
the Commissioner finally conceded on the issue,6 but only briefly.
He soon launched a new attack against doctors by proposing new
regulations, adopted in 1960, and known as the "Kintner Regula-
tions." 67 These regulations, still in effect today, constituted an un-
abashed attempt to overrule Kintner administratively.6 s Using cri-
teria first promulgated in 1935 by the Supreme Court in Morrissey
v. Commissioner,69 the "Kintner Regulations" are heavily weighted
toward partnership classification and against association
classification.70
The professionals and the private tax bar, however, were not
to be outdone. Rather than confront the Commissioner head-on,
they used their political clout to pressure state legislators to enact
61 Kurzner, 413 F.2d at 101.
62 See Kurzner, 413 F.2d at 100-01; Eaton, supra note 57, at 5-6.
63 216 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1954).
Id. at 428.
66 See Rev. Rul. 56-23, 1956-1 C.B. 598.
68 See Rev. Rul. 57-546, 1957-2 C.B. 886.
17 Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-1-301.7701-11 (1985).
66 W. McKFE, W. NELSON & R. WHITMIRE, FEDERAL TAXATION OF PARTNERSHIPS AND
PARTNERS § 306(1) (1977); see Kurzner, 413 F.2d at 105; Eaton, supra note 57, at 7; N.Y.U.
Note, supra note 27, at 416.
66 296 U.S. 344 (1935).
70 See Kurzner, 413 F.2d at 105; Fisher, supra note 57, at 630; Note, supra note 57, at
1265; Comment, The Viability of a Tax Shelter Vehicle: Limited Partnerships with a Cor-
poration as Sole General Partner, 49 Miss. L.J. 469, 473 (1978).
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statutes permitting the incorporation of professionals. 71 The intent
of the state acts was clear. The state legislatures wanted to clothe
their professional corporations with enough corporate attributes to
qualify as "associations" under the Kintner Regulations, thereby
entitling professionals to the tax advantages for fringe benefits and
deferred compensation plans available to corporations. Playing a
game of one-upmanship, the Commissioner amended the regula-
tions in 1965 in a transparent attempt to thwart the efficacy of
state professional incorporation acts.72 However, courts uniformly
invalidated the amended regulations as being arbitrary and dis-
criminatory.73 Seemingly daunted, the Commissioner at last con-
ceded in a 1970 revenue ruling that it would allow association clas-
sification for professional corporations.74 A 1977 revenue ruling
went even further, stating that professional corporations may qual-
ify as corporations without running the gauntlet of satisfying the
Kintner Regulations. 75
The Commissioner of The Internal Revenue Service, of course,
has found other ways to attack professional corporations.7 6 For ex-
ample, one case involved a general partnership for the practice of
medicine.77 One of the partners formed a professional association
with himself as the sole shareholder and made himself an employee
so that he could secure the tax benefits of a defined benefit plan
and a medical reimbursement plan.78 The doctor substituted the
professional association for himself as the partner in the medical
71 See Note, supra note 58, at 776-77.
712 See Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-1(c), 301.7701-2(h), T.D. 6797, 1965-1 C.B. 52. The
amendments to the regulations, first proposed in December 1963, were adopted in February
1965. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-(c) added a provision saying that state labels had no impor-
tance in classifying an organization for tax purposes, and that professional organizations
were so inherently different, they would almost never be taxed as corporations.
73 See supra note 44.
74 See Rev. Rul. 70-101, 1970-1 C.B. 278. After losing in the courts, the government
acknowledged the validity of professional corporation statutes in forty-six states. See id. at
278-80.
75 See Rev. Rul. 77-31, 1977-1 C.B. 409.
7' See, e.g., The Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA), Pub. L.
No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324. TEFRA reduced the fringe benefits available to professional corpo-
rations and increased their availability to non-corporate entities. See Comment, Is the Pro-
fessional Association Dead after TEFRA? The Continuing Saga of Hunter and Hunted, 36
ARK. L. REv. 508, 508 (1983). The government also has used common-law tax principles,
such as the assignment of income, and statutory tax avoidance rules, such as those con-
tained in §§ 269 and 269A. See id. at 518-21.
7 See Keller v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 1014, aft'd., 723 F.2d 58 (10th Cir. 1981).
78 Id. at 1016.
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firm.79 The government unsuccessfully invoked section 482 in an
effort to deny the doctor the fruits of his plan.s° Following this
defeat, Congress overruled the case legislatively by enacting sec-
tion 269A of the Code,sl which grants the government the power to
reallocate deductions and income between a "personal service cor-
poration" and its shareholder-employee when the corporation
serves no meaningful purpose other than securing a tax benefit not
otherwise available to the taxpayer.8 2 Additionally, the Commis-
sioner is in the process of persuading Congress to overhaul the
Code's treatment of fringe benefits and deferred compensation
plans, generally equalizing their availability to corporations and
unincorporated business entities.83 Once this process is complete,
professionals will have less incentive to incorporate.
An unintended by-product of the Kintner Regulations has
been the proliferation of tax shelter limited partnerships. Because
the Kintner Regulations make it difficult for business organizations
not incorporated under state statutes to achieve association status,
tax planners have been able to construct limited partnerships that
function like corporations but avoid association classification
under the Kintner Regulations.8 4 Classified as partnerships for fed-
eral tax purposes, these businesses have been able to pass through
losses to their investors and to avoid double taxation on their earn-
ings, much to the chagrin of the Commissioner.
Although courts have noted the shortcomings of the Kintner
Regulations, they have been unwilling to depart from them.
8 5
79 Id. at 1017.
80 Id. at 1028-29.
81 I.R.C. § 269A (1985).
82 Id.; see Comment, supra note 76, at 529-30; Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxa-
tion, 97th Cong., 2d Sess (1982); General Explanation of the Tax Equity in Fiscal Responsi-
bility Act of 1982, at 326 (Comm. print 1982); 128 Cong. Rec. § 10903 (daily ed., Aug. 19,
1982) (statement of Sen. Dole).
83 For example, the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA), Pub.
L. No. 97-248, §§ 235-246, 96 Stat. 324, 505, provided new tax rules to achieve parity be-
tween corporate and noncorporate pension plans. See H.R. REP. No. 4961, 97th Cong., 2d
Sess. 9 (1982). For a discussion of fringe benefits and deferred compensation plans, see gen-
erally Halliday, The Advantages and Disadvantages of Professional Corporations and Part-
nerships after TEFRA, 8 REV. OF TAx'N OF INDIVIDuALs 23, 24-25 (1984); McGill & Davis,
The Personal Service Corporation After TEFRA: An Analysis of Section 269A and the
Proposed Regulation, 61 TAXEs 540, 543 (1983).
84 See Fisher, supra note 57, at 633; N.Y.U. Note, supra note 27, at 417-18; Note, supra
note 57, at 1266.
8' See, e.g., Zuckman v. United States, 524 F.2d 729, 739 (Ct. Cl. 1975) (court reaffirm-
ing reasonableness and validity of regulations); Larson v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 159, 185-86
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Rumblings in Congress and elsewhere indicate that changes in
classification criteria may be forthcoming."' As of yet, however, the
Kintner Regulations remain the primary source of rules on the
classification issue.
A MECHANICAL TEST
The regulations take a mechanical approach to the classifica-
tion issue. They list the six characteristics of the "pure" corpora-
tion, the same characteristics promulgated in Morrissey in 1935:
first, the presence of associates; second, an objective to carry on
business and divide the profits; third, continuity of life; fourth,
centralized management; fifth, limited liability of investors; and
sixth, free transferability of investors' interests.8 7 Following the
lead of Morrissey, the regulations say that two of these characteris-
tics, the presence of associates and a business objective, are essen-
tial to classification as an association.8 Without both of them, the
organization is not an association and will not be treated as a cor-
poration for federal tax purposes. If these two characteristics are
present, the next step is to determine whether the organization has
any of the other four corporate characteristics. An unincorporated
organization should not be classified as an association unless it has
more corporate characteristics than noncorporate characteristics.8 "
If, however, any of these characteristics is common to both a cor-
poration and the noncorporate form under consideration, that
common characteristic must be disregarded in the weighing pro-
cessY0 For example, if two of the characteristics are common to
both the corporation and the noncorporate form under considera-
(1976) (upholding regulations through disagreeing with way they were written).
So See, e.g., S. REP. No. 95, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 7, 23, 50-51, 80, 106 (1983); Fisher,
supra note 57, at 663 (incompatiblility of regulations and caselaw militates in favor of fur-
ther regulations or legislation); Peel, Definition of a Partnership: New Suggestions on an
Old Issue, 1979 Wis. L. REv. 989, 1000; Rosen, Effect of Proposed Amendments to Section
7701 Regulations on Leveraged Issues, 9 J. CoRP. TAX'N 53, 53-55 (1982) (discussing effect
of proposed regulations); N.Y.U. Note, supra note 27, at 410.
87 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(1) (1983); see Morrissey v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 344,
359 (1935).
" See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(2) (1983); see also Morrissey, 296 U.S. at 353-54 &
n.10 (discussing amendments to Tax Regulations distinguishing trusts and associations). For
further discusson of the essential characteristics of an association, see infra notes 131-177
and accompanying text (associates requirement); infra notes 139-140 and accompanying text
(business objective requirement).
89 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(3) (1983).
80 See id.
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tion, then the organization must have three of the four remaining
characteristics to be classified as a corporation."' Although the reg-
ulations provide that, in addition to the factors listed, other factors
significant in classifying the organizational form may be consid-
ered, courts have been reluctant to depart from the listed charac-
teristics in their examinations.2 Moreover, courts have been con-
strained by the regulations to give equal weight to the Morrissey
characteristics, even when a flexible weighing system would more
accurately measure the resemblance of the entity being evaluated
to the corporate form.93
The following paragraphs will discuss the six enumerated
characteristics in detail.
Presence of Associates
The requirement of associates is the least discussed and least
understood of the six corporate characteristics. Although the regu-
lations offer detailed explanations and examples for four of the
other five characteristics,94 they contain virtually nothing about
what the requirement of associates is supposed to mean. Crypti-
cally, the regulations declare:
Since associates and an objective to carry on business for
joint profit are essential characteristics of all organizations en-
gaged in business for profit (other than the so-called one-man
corporation and the sole proprietorship), the absence of either of
these essential characteristics will cause an arrangement among
co-owners of property for the development of such property for
91 Id.; see, e.g., Kurzner v. United States, 413 F.2d 97, 109 (5th Cir. 1969) (possession of
more than half of four characteristics requires classification as corporation); Zuckman v.
United States, 524 F.2d 729, 744 (Ct. Cl. 1975) (presence of three or more characteristics
warrants classification as association).
9'2 See Zuckman v. United States, 524 F.2d 729, 744 (Ct. Cl. 1975); Larson v. Commis-
sioner, 66 T.C. 159, 172, 185 (1976). But see Outlaw v. United States, 494 F.2d 1376, 1385
(Ct. Cl.) (considering factors other than six listed by regulations), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 844
(1974).
" See, e.g., Kurzner v. United States, 413 F.2d 97, 105 (5th Cir. 1969) (court applied
regulations and Morrissey characteristics and found corporate status under both tests); Lar-
son v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 159, 172, 185 (1976) (court described Morrissey principle as
"starting point" of regulations' definition of association).
14 See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b) (1983) (continuity of life); id. § 301.7701-2(c) (cen-
tralized management); id. § 301.7701-2(c) (limited liability); id. § 301.7701-2(e) (free trans-
ferability of interests). As with the requirement of associates, the regulations neither discuss
nor exemplify the requirement of a business objective. For further discussion of that re-
quirement, see infra note 105 and accompanying text.
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the separate profit of each not to be classified as an association. 5
Some commentators have inferred from this sentence that a solely-
owned business cannot be classified as an association for federal
tax purposes, because it does not have associates.98 But if the sec-
ond clause is limited to organizations formed from the develop-
ment of co-owned property, then the sentence does not apply to
organizations formed for the development of solely-owned prop-
erty. Likewise, if the second clause is limited to organizations that
develop property, for example, firms that develop shopping cen-
ters, then the sentence does not apply to organizations formed to
carry on other types of business ventures such as firms in the ser-
vice industries. Additionally, the first clause provides the rationale
for the rule of law in the sentence, which is stated in the second
clause. The parenthetical language in the first clause states in ef-
fect that the proposition contained in that first clause is inapplica-
ble to the "so-called one-man corporation and the sole proprietor-
ship." If the rationale is declared to be inapplicable to one-man
corporations and sole proprietorships, it follows that the rule of
law based on that rationale is likewise inapplicable to such
businesses.
In short, contrary to what some people think, the regulations,
though confusing, do not necessarily require that an entity have
multiple owners before it can be classified as an association. What,
then, is the intent of the garbled sentence quoted above?
The answer to this question probably rests in history. Many of
the early classification cases, including Morrissey, involved busi-
ness trusts used to develop real estate.9 7 Courts sought criteria to
differentiate these business trusts from more traditional trusts,
such as testamentary trusts, which might also hold title to real es-
tate for multiple beneficial owners.98 In evaluating the trust before
Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(2) (1983).
See B. BrrrKER & J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INcohm TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND
SHAREHOLDERS T 2.07 (4th ed. 1979); J. MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INcoME TAX § 38A.11
(1984); 10 FED. TAXES (P-H) T 41,617 (1985).
97 See, e.g., Morrissey v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 344, 356-57 (1935) (describing trust
involved as association rather than ordinary trust where combination is for conducting busi-
ness enterprise); Helvering v. Coleman-Gilbert Assocs., 296 U.S. 369, 370 (1935) (trust
agreement wherein trustees held property for beneficiaries); Helvering v. Combs, 296 U.S.
365, 366 (1935) (trust created to finance and drill oil well); Swanson v. Commissioner, 296
U.S. 362, 363 (1935) (trust agreement for purpose of carrying title to property).
11 See, e.g., Morrissey, 296 U.S. at 359-60 (describing association as those trusts whose
participants carry on business and divide gains accruing from the undertaking); Coleman-
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it, Morrissey properly emphasized the use of the trust as a medium
to conduct business. 99 Unfortunately, however, the Morrissey
Court became hooked, momentarily, on the word "association"
(which was in the statute) and tried to ascribe to it a significance it
did not deserve. "'Association,'" the Court opined, "implies asso-
ciates." 100 Business trusts and ordinary trusts differ, the Court con-
tinued, in that parties to business trusts, unlike beneficiaries of or-
dinary trusts, voluntarily join together in their common
undertaking. 101 They choose to associate with each other. Hence,
they are "associates." The beneficiaries of a testamentary trust
may be beneficial co-owners of real estate, but they do not volunta-
rily associate with each other in a joint enterprise. Therefore, they
are not "associates," and their trust is not an "association.'
0 2
This bit of attenuated reasoning was at best subsidiary to the
Court's primary theme that the business objective differentiates
business trusts from ordinary trusts. It added nothing to the
strength of the Court's analysis. Indeed, the Morrissey opinion
would have been better off without it. Moreover, the reasoning in
Morrissey should never have been used to elevate the presence of
associates to its current rank in the regulations as one of the six
pure corporate characteristics. At the very least, applicability of
the associates requirement should be limited to its original pur-
pose: to distinguish between business trusts, especially those used
for the development of real estate, and ordinary trusts. Courts
should apply literally the language of the current regulation, limit-
ing its application to arrangements to develop co-owned property.
The associates requirement should not be interpreted as requiring
an entity to have multiple owners before it can be classified as an
association. It should not be used to disqualify a business trust
with a single beneficiary from classification as an association. 10 3
Gilbert Assocs., 296 U.S. at 372 (trust where trustees owned and operated twenty apartment
houses deemed association); Combs, 296 U.S. at 367-68 (trust agreement to finance and drill
for production and sale of oil wherein trustees were not individually liable except for willful
misconduct and were empowered to sell products of well and borrow money warrants find-
ing of association); Swanson, 296 U.S. at 363-65 (trust agreement wherein trustees could
manage and control property or borrow money secured by property warrants finding of
association).
:9 See 296 U.S. at 357.
100 See id. at 356.
Id. at 357.
102 Id. at 356-57.
o3 Business trusts, even if deemed to have "associates," are likely to be disqualified for
lacking the other corporate characteristics - for example continuity of life and transferabil-
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Neither the courts nor the government have harped on the
presence of associates as constituting a requirement for association
status. Indeed, there exists some case authority that finds one-per-
son organizations to be corporations for federal tax purposes. 04
Undoubtedly, thousands of organizations owned by single persons
file corporate tax returns each year without encountering classifica-
tion problems. Hopefully, neither the government nor the courts
will treat the associates requirement as an inchoate trap against
unwary taxpayers. The notion that the term "association" implies
multiple owners contradicts not only the literal language of the
regulation, but also the expectation of entrepreneurs and tax plan-
ners that one-person corporations are indeed corporations and
should be taxed as corporations.
Objective to Carry on Business and Divide Profits
An objective to carry on business and divide profits is the
other corporate characteristic that is neither explained nor exem-
plified in the regulations. Like the associates requirement, this re-
quirement originated in Morrissey as a method to differentiate
business trusts from ordinary trusts. 0 5 Unlike the associates re-
quirement, however, it is not abstruse. An entity without an objec-
tive to carry on a business for profit clearly should not be classified
as a corporation.
Continuity of Life
A corporation is an independent legal entity, separate and dis-
tinct from its shareholders, and unaffected by changes in the iden-
tity of the parties owning its shares. 106 Thus, continuity of life is a
corporate characteristic. An organization has continuity of life for
federal tax purposes, according to the regulations, if the death, in-
sanity, bankruptcy, retirement, resignation, or expulsion of any
member will not cause a dissolution of the organization. 0 7 If local
law establishes a technical dissolution of the organization upon
ity of interests. See B. BrrKER & J. EusTic, supra note 96, at § 2.07.
I" See, e.g., Lombard Trustees, Ltd. v. Commissioner, 136 F.2d 22, 23-24 (9th Cir.
1943) (sole shareholder deemed corporation for federal tax purposes); Hynes v. Commis-
sioner, 74 T.C. 1266, 1280 (1980) (associate similar to shareholder, even if only one
associate).
0' See Morrissey v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 344, 356 (1935).
106 See supra note 4.
1' Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b)(1) (1983).
1985]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
such an event, even if all of the members agree to continue the
operations of the business, continuity of life is lacking. 10 8 Dissolu-
tion is said to be an alteration of the identity of an organization by
reason of a change in the relationship between the members as de-
termined under local law.109 For example, the resignation of a part-
ner ordinarily destroys the partnership. 110 Hence, the typical part-
nership lacks continuity of life.'11
Centralized Management
State corporation law ordinarily invests the board of directors
with the power to manage the affairs of corporations. 1 2 Hence,
centralized management is a corporate characteristic. An entity has
centralized management for federal tax purposes, according to the
regulations, if it invests one or more people with management au-
thority resembling the powers and functions of the directors of a
corporation." 3 Generally, that resemblance exists when the desig-
nated parties hold a continuing power to make business decisions
without ratification by the owners of the business.1"4 Centralized
management does not exist, however, when the managers perform
ministerial acts only."' Then they are more like agents acting at
the direction of a principal."8 Similarly, there is no centralized
management unless the parties invested with the power of manage-
ment have sole authority to make decisions.17 "For example, in
the case of a corporation or a trust, the concentration of manage-
ment powers in a board of directors or trustees effectively prevents
a stockholder or a trust beneficiary, simply because he is a stock-
holder or beneficiary, from binding the corporation or the trust by
his acts."""
:8 Id. § 301.7701-2(b)(i)-(2).
0 Id. § 301.7701-2(b)(2).
"o See UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 31 (1914); J. CRANE & A. BROMBERG, supra note 19, at
§ 73.
I See infra notes 146-149 and accompanying text.
:1 See generally 2 F.H. O'NEW , supra note 24, at § 3.12.
13 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c)(1)(1983).
114 Id. § 301.7701-2(c)(3).
110 Id.
110 Id.





Because a corporation is an independent legal entity, separate
and apart from its shareholders, the personal assets of the share-
holders are generally free from liability for corporate obligations.
The shareholders' risk of loss is limited to their investment in the
corporation.119 This limited liability is a primary advantage in
choosing the corporate form for closely-held businesses.120 An en-
tity provides its members with limited liability if, under local law,
none of its members are personally liable for the debts of the en-
tity merely by.virtue of their membership in the organization.' 2 '
Free Transferability of Interest.
According to the traditional corporate norm, shareholders
have the power to transfer or to retain their shares without inter-
ference by the other shareholders or the corporation. 22 For share-
holders in close corporations, this right may be chimerical, because
often there is no market for the shares, or the shares are subject to
stock transfer restrictions. 23 Nevertheless, the free transferability
of shares is generally considered to be a corporate characteristic
and is one of the six corporate characteristics enumerated in the
regulations. 24 According to the regulations, an entity has free
transferability of interest if each of its members (or those members
owning virtually all the interests in the entity) has the power,
without the consent of other members, to transfer all of the attrib-
utes of his interest, pecuniary and managerial, to a person who is
not a member of the organization. 25 Unfortunately, neither the
regulations nor the courts are especially helpful in delineating the
impact of stock transfer restrictions on this particular corporate
characteristic. According to the regulations, if a member can trans-
fer his interest in the organization only after offering such interest
to the other members at fair market value (a type of first option),
he has a "modified form of free transferability," but "this modified
corporate characteristic will be accorded less significance than if
119 See generally 2 F.H. O'NEAL, supra note 24, § 1.10.
120 Id.
121 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(d)(1) (1983).
"2 H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BusiNEss ENTERPRISES
§ 74 (3d ed. 1983).
123 2 F.H. O'NEAL, supra note 24, §§ 1.07, 7.02.
M Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(1) (1985).
'25 Id. § 301.7701-2(e)(1).
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such characteristic were present in a nonmodified form. '126 It is
difficult to see why this minimal restraint on alienability should
result in discounting the factor of free transferability. It is closely
akin to a right of first refusal, which is a true restraint on transfer-
ability only on the rare occasion when the transferor cares about
the identity of the transferee.1 27 The regulations are silent about
rights of first refusal, buy-sell agreements, 2 s consent restric-
tions,129 and first options at less than fair market value. 30 Presum-
ably, rights of first refusal would create a "modified form of free
transferability," like the first option at fair market value. A con-
sent restriction should destroy the characteristic of free transfera-
bility. Buy-sell agreements and first options at less than fair mar-
ket value might destroy free transferability, too, but their terms
are so variegated that such a determination likely would depend on
their terms and the facts and circumstances of the particular
situation.
TRUST OR ASSOCIATION?
The regulations declare that continuity of life, centralization
of management, limited liability, and free transferability of inter-
126 Id. § 301.7701-2(e)(2); see Kurzner v. United States, 413 F.2d 97, 108-09 (5th Cir.
1969).
127 The right of first refusal is a stock transfer restriction that prohibits the sale of
stock unless the shares are first offered to the corporation, the other shareholders, or both,
on the same term offered by a third party. See W. CARY & M. EISENSERG, CASES AND MATER-
IALS ON CORPORATIONS 474-75 (5th ed. unabr. 1980). Of the basic types of stock transfer
restrictions, the right of first refusal is the least restrictive in its impact on the selling share-
holder. Id. at 475. The right of first refusal merely limits the selling shareholder's choice of
transferees, while ensuring him the price and terms equal to those offered by the outsider.
See Tu-Vu Drive-In Corp. v. Ashkins, 61 Cal. 2d 283, 285, 391 P.2d 828, 830, 38 Cal. Rptr.
348, 350 (1964).
128 Under a buy-sell agreement, the shareholder is obligated to sell, and the corporation
or the other shareholders to purchase, upon the terms delineated in the agreement. See 2
F.H. O'NEAL, supra note 24, § 7.05; Garrity, Buy-Sell Agreements, 46 PA. BAR A.Q. 190, 190
(1975); Rands, supra note 4, at 461.
121 Consent restrictions require the transferring shareholder to give notice of intention
to transfer and get the consent or approval by the directors for the other shareholders. See 2
F. H. O'NWEAL, supra note 24, at § 7.05; Rands, supra note 4, at 461.
'30 A first option is a reservation by the corporation or the shareholders of an option to
purchase the shares of the corporation in preference to outsiders. See 2 F. L O'NAL, supra
note 24, at § 7.05; Rands, supra note 4, at 461. Typically, the right to exercise the option is
triggered by any proposed sale, gift, bequest, pledge, or other disposition of the shares, or by
bankruptcy, adjudicated insanity, death, or termination of employment of the shareholder.
The first option price can be determined in a variety of ways, for example by the book value
of shares. See Rands, supra note 4, at 461.
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est are common characteristics of both trusts and corporations. 131
Thus, classification of a trust as an association requires the pres-
ence of both associates and a business objective.13 2 As discussed
above, although some authorities suggest that the term "associ-
ates" implies co-owners or a joint venture, the requirement of asso-
ciates is of dubious merit, 33 and it has been held that a one-man
grantor "business" trust can be an association. 3 4 The term "trust,"
according to the regulations, refers to an arrangement in which
trustees take title to property for the purpose of protecting or con-
serving it for the beneficiaries. 35 In contrast, "business trusts" are
devices to carry on a profit-making business that would normally
have been carried on through corporations or partnerships. 3 6 A
business trust will generally be considered an association for fed-
eral tax purposes. 3 7
The regulations also speak briefly about "investment" trusts
and liquidating trusts. Investment trusts are treated as associa-
tions only if the trustees have power under the trust agreement to
vary the investment of the certificate holders.' Liquidating trusts
are classified as trusts for federal tax purposes if they are formed
for the primary purpose of liquidating and distributing assets
transferred to them- that is, if they do not have the purpose of
carrying on a profit-making business.139 If the liquidation is unrea-
sonably prolonged or is subsequently used to control or operate a
business on a continuing basis, however, it will be classified as an
association rather than a trust.140 In short, the key in determining
the classification of most trusts is the presence or absence of a
profit-making objective.' 4 '
See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(2) (1985).
133 See id.
133 See supra notes 94-104 and accompanying text.
See Lombard Trustees, Ltd. v. Commissioner, 136 F.2d 22, 23-24 (9th Cir. 1943);
Hynes v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 1266, 1286 (1980).
'" Treas. Reg. § 301-7701-4(a) (1985).
130 Id. § 301.7701-4(b); see Barrett & de Valpine, Taxation of Business Trusts and
Other Unincorporated Massachusetts Entities with Transferable Shares, 40 B.U.L. REv.
329, 333-34 (1960).
'37 See, e.g., Morrissey v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 344, 361 (1935) (business trust cre-
ated to enable participants to carry on business and divide gains deemed association); Out-
law v. United States, 494 F.2d 1376, 1386 (Ct. Cl. 1974) (trust formed for ownership and
management of farm lands for investment deemed association).
1" Tress. Reg. § 301.7701-4(c) (1983).
133 Id. § 301.7701-4(d).
140 Id.
141 See Morrissey v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 344, 360-61 (1935); Howard v. United
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CORPORATION OR PARTNERSHIP
The regulations, the primary source of rules governing the
classification issue, are heavily weighted in favor of partnership
classification and against corporation classification. Indeed, only
certain types of hybrid partnership arrangements have any chance
at all of being classified as a corporation. As discussed below, the
regulations make it virtually impossible for a partnership organ-
ized under statutes similar to the Uniform Partnership Act (UPA)
or the Uniform Limited Partnership Act (ULPA) to be classified as
a corporation.
According to the regulations, because both partnerships and
corporations are assumed to have associates and a business objec-
tive, these two characteristics must be disregarded in the classifica-
tion process. 142 Therefore, the classification of a partnership de-
pends upon the characteristics of continuity of life, centralized
management, limited liability, and free transferability of interests.
For a partnership to be classified as a corporation, it must possess
three of these four major characteristics. General partnerships gen-
erally are thought not to possess any of these four corporate char-
acteristics. 143 On the other hand, a limited partnership may closely
resemble a typical corporation, especially if the partnership has
only one general partner, which is a corporation with neither sub-
stantial assets of its own nor a significant proprietary interest in
partnership itself.14 4 A casual observer unfamiliar with the details
of the Kintner Regulations might conclude that such a partnership
has all of the six characteristics of the pure corporation and would
be classified as a corporation for federal tax purposes. At some
point the classification rules indeed may be changed to reflect the
equivalence between such a limited partnership and a corpora-
States, 54 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) 84-5029, 84-5036 (1984).
14 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(2) (1985).
143 Typical general partnerships lack continuity of life because any of a number of
events-for example, death of a partner-results in termination of the partnership. See H.
REUSCHLEIN & W. GREGORY, supra note 19, at § 229. Also, the typical partnership has noth-
ing resembling a board of directors, for each partner usually has an equal vote in partner-
ship matters. See id. § 184. Partners in a typical general partnership risk unlimited personal
liability for business obligations. See id. § 206. Finally, general partners are rarely free to
transfer their interest without consent of the other partners. See id. § 171.
14 See supra notes 19-28 and accompanying text; see also Peel, supra note 86, at 1000;
Harvard Note, supra note 27, at 745 (discussing characteristics that make limited partner-
ship resemble corporation more than partnership); Note, supra note 57, at 1269 (discussing
factors that lead to finding that limited partnership resembles corporation).
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tion.'14 The heavy bias in the Kintner Regulations toward partner-
ship classification, however, predetermines the classification of vir-
tually all limited partnerships as a partnership for federal tax
purposes, despite their resemblance to corporations.
The paragraphs below discuss the treatment of partnerships in
the regulations and examine the corporate characteristics not
shared by all partnerships and corporations.
Partnerships: Lack of Continuity of Life
The regulations make it clear that both UPA general partner-
ships and ULPA limited partnerships lack continuity of life.
146
UPA partnerships lack continuity of life, because a myriad of
events, for example, death of a partner, may terminate them.
147
ULPA limited partnerships lack continuity of life because the
death, legal incapacity, resignation, or bankruptcy of a general
partner causes a dissolution.14 A limited partnership can avert
death or incapacity problems by using a corporation as its general
partner, but it cannot eliminate the possibility of a bankruptcy for
that corporation. This mere possibilty has led courts and the draft-
ers of the regulations to conclude that ULPA limited partnerships
lack continuity of life.4 9
Partnerships: Lack of Centralized Management
The regulations state explicitly that partnerships organized
under statutes similar to the UPA lack centralized management
because, under these statutes, the act of any partner within the
scope of partnership business binds all the partners.150 Even if the
partners agree among themselves to delegate the power of manage-
ment to a group of managing partners, this agreement is ineffective
as against outsiders who have no notice of it.' 5 ' Management of
limited partnerships is concentrated in the general partners, thus
,,5 A Senate report suggests that publicly traded limited partnerships should be classi-
fied as corporations for federal tax purposes. See S. REP. No. 95, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 7, 23,
50-51, 80, 106 (1983).
'4' Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b)(3) (1983).
117 See UNIF. PARTNERSHIP Acr § 31 (1914); Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b) (1983).
'4' See REV. UNIF. LIMITED PARTNERSHIP AcT § 402; Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b) (1983).
149 See Zuckman v. United States, 524 F.2d 729, 734 (Ct. Cl. 1975); Treas. Reg. §
301.7701-2(b)(3) (1983).
"I Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c)(4) (1983).
151 See id.
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giving the appearance of centralized management, but the regula-
tions nevertheless take the position that limited partnerships usu-
ally lack the centralized management characteristic. 152 The regula-
tions emphasize that, unlike a board of directors, general partners
usually act partially in their own behalf, and therefore do not act
in a purely representative capacity.153 Thus, a limited partnership
has centralized management only if the limited partners hold sub-
stantially all of the partnership interests and the general partners
hold virtually none.' 54 An unrestricted power in the limited part-
ners to remove a general partner is an indication that a limited
partnership possesses centralized management. 55
Partnerships: Lack of Limited Liability
General partnerships almost always lack limited liability be-
cause partners are personally responsible for the debts and obliga-
tions of the partnership. 56 While the limited partners of a limited
partnership ordinarily are not personally liable, the general partner
is. 157 The personal liability of the general partner eliminates the
possibility of a limited partnership having the corporate character-
istic of limited liability, because the regulations require that, for an
organization to possess the characteristic of limited liability, every
member must have limited liability. 158 The regulations seem to rec-
ognize a limited exception, but there is a Catch-22. When the gen-
eral partner has no substantial assets outside of the limited part-
nership and is "merely a 'dummy' acting as an agent of the limited
partners," the general partner is deemed to have no personal liabil-
ity.159 When the general partner is merely the agent of the limited
partners, however, the limited partners lose their limited liabil-
ity.'60 Again, the limited partnership lacks limited liability because
152 See id.
Id. § 301.7701-2(c)(1)-(2), (4).
' Id. § 301.7701-2(c)(4); see Zuckman v. United States, 524 F.2d 729, 737-38 (Ct. CL
1975); Larson v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 159, 176-77 (1976); Felton, A Larson-Zuckman
Checklist for Partnership Tax Classification of ULPA Real Estate Shelters, 11 U. RicH. L.
REv. 743, 757 (1977); Peel, supra note 86, at 993.
"' See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c)(4) (1983).
'" See id. § 301.7701-2(d)(1); UNIF. PARTNERSHIP AcT §§ 13-15 (1914). See generally H.
REUSCHLEIN & W. GREGORY, supra note 19, at § 206 (discussing nature of partnership
liability).
:'7 See generally H. REUSCHLEIN & W. GREGORY, supra note 19, at § 264.
Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(d)(1) (1983).
Id. § 301.701-2(d)(2).
110 See UNIF. LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ACT § 7 (1916).
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at least one of the partners (this time the limited partners) lacks
limited liability."0' The end result is that the regulations make it
impossible for both UPA general partnerships and ULPA limited
partnerships to have limited liability. 162
Partnerships: Lack of Free Transferability of Interests
An organization has the corporate characteristic of free trans-
ferability of interests if each of its members can, without the con-
sent of other members, substitute a person not currently a member
of the organization for themselves. 63 The member must be able to
confer upon his substitute all of the attributes of his interests in
the organization.6 4 According to the UPA, a conveyance by a part-
ner of his interest in the partnership does not dissolve the partner-
ship, but, in absence of a contrary agreement with the other part-
ners, it does not entitle the assignee to interfere in the
management of the partnership or even to inspect the partnership
books.' -65 Thus, a UPA partnership lacks free transferability of
interests.
A ULPA limited partnership, on the other hand, can have the
corporate characteristic of free transferability of interests, pro-
vided it meets two conditions. First, the limited partnership agree-
ment must grant the limited partners the right to transfer their
interests to an outside party and thereby confer all of their rights
in the organization on their transferee, both without the consent of
the other partners (a type of provision allowed by the ULPA but
not by the UPA). e6 Second, the limited partners must own sub-
stantially all of the partnership interests. 67 The second condition
is grounded on the following reasoning. According to the Kintner
Regulations, every "member" of the organization must be able to
transfer its interest freely for the organization to have free trans-
ferability of interest.'0 8 Under the ULPA, transfer of a general
"I See id.; Tress. Reg. § 301.7701-2(d)(2) (1983); Zuckman v. United States, 524 F.2d
729, 741 (Ct. Cl. 1975); see also Felton, supra note 154, at 761-62 (discussing lack of corpo-
rate entity).
112 See Zuckman v. United States, 524 F.2d 729, 739-42 (Ct. Cl. 1975).
"3 Tress. Reg. § 301.7701-2(e)(1) (1983).
164 Id.
105 UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 27(1) (1914).
100 Tress. Reg. § 301.7701-2(e)(1) (1983).
SId.; see Zuckman v. United States, 524 F.2d 729, 742 (Ct. Cl. 1975); Larson v. Com-
missioner, 66 T.C. 159, 182, 184 (1976); Felton, supra note 154, at 762-63.
100 See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(e)(1) (1983).
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partner's interest causes dissolution of the partnership." 9 If the
general partner does not own a significant partnership interest,
however, it is not a "member" of the organization. 170 Because the
general partner is not a "member," its inability to transfer its in-
terest without causing a dissolution is irrelevant to the issue of the
free transferability of interests of the "members" of the
organization.' 17
If the limited partners do not own substantially all of the part-
nership interests, then the general partner is a "member" of the
organization. If this is the case, because the general partner cannot
transfer its interest without causing a dissolution under the ULPA,
the partnership will not have the characteristic of free transferabil-
ity of interests. 72
Impossibility of Association Status for Partnerships Under the
Kintner Regulations
As the foregoing analysis demonstrates, the current regula-
tions (the Kintner Regulations) make it clear that a partnership
formed under a statute similar to the Uniform Partnership Act will
never qualify as an association under section 7701. It is impossible
for such a partnership to have any of the four corporate character-
istics not generally shared by corporations and partnerships. A
limited partnership formed under a statute similar to the Uniform
Limited Partnership Act or the Revised Uniform Limited Partner-
ship Act occasionally can have centralized management and free
transferability of interests, but never can have continuity of life
and limited liability. It needs at least three of the four characteris-
tics, however, and, thus, under the regulations' preponderance test
cannot be classified as an association. In recent years, the govern-
ment has nonetheless sought to classify several limited partner-
ships as associations.'7  The courts, however, have required the
government to abide by its own regulations mechanically applying
the preponderance test to find partnerships not to be associa-
tions. 7 4 In 1977, the government proposed new regulations that
1'9 See UNIF. LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ACT § 9 (1916).
170 See Larson v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 159, 176-78, 182 (1976).
7 See id.
172 Zuckman v. United States, 524 F.2d 729, 742-44 (Ct. C1. 1975).
173 See id. at 732-33; Larson v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 159, 171 (1976).
14 See Zuckman, 524 F.2d at 734-44; Larson, 66 T.C. at 173-86.
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were decidedly less mechanical than the Kintner Regulations. 175
Amidst howls of protests from the real estate community, the gov-
ernment quickly withdrew them.1 76 Changes are likely to occur
sometime, however; a preliminary congressional study has sug-
gested that publicly traded limited partnerships be taxed as
corporations.1 77
DISREGARDING THE CORPORATE ENTITY
Introduction
Because use of the corporate form can produce either good or
bad tax consequences for the owners of a closely held business en-
terprise, taxpayers and the government often fight over whether or
not a particular corporate entity should be respected as a distinct,
taxable entity. Sometimes the taxpayer wants the corporate entity
to be be disregarded for tax purposes,1 78 and sometimes the gov-
ernment wants it to be disregarded.1 79 The party arguing against
corporate status sometimes adds an alternative argument: even if
the corporation is to be recognized as a separate +taxable entity, the
tax consequences from its activities (or its ownership of property)
1711 42 Fed. Reg. 1038 (1977); see Peel, supra note 86, at 1000-02.
170 Peel, supra note 86, at 1000. The real estate community was fearful that the new
regulations would have made limited partnerships taxable as corporations instead of as
partnerships. Unlike partnerships, the corporations would have been unable to pass through
the tax benefits of the project to the investors. See id.; N.Y. Times, Jan. 6, 1977, at 1, col. 1;
Wash. Post, Jan. 6, 1977, at Al, col. 5.
177 See S. REP. No. 95, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 7, 23, 50-51, 80, 106 (1983).
78 See, e.g., Moline Properties, Inc. v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 436, 440 (1943) (tax-
payer unsuccessfully urging that corporation is mere agent for stockholder); Elath Rafferty
Farms, Inc. V. United States, 511 F.2d 1234, 1237 (8th Cir.) (taxpayer unsuccessfully urging
court to find corporate entity either a fictional farce or agent), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 834
(1975); Taylor v. Commissioner, 445 F.2d 455, 457 (1st Cir. 1971) (taxpayer unsuccessfully
urging that corporate entity was straw and corporation in name only); Red Carpet Car
Wash, Inc. v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 676, 684 (1980) (taxpayer unsuccessfully urging entity
was corporation in name only); Rogers v. Commissioner, 34 T.C.M. (CCH) 1254, 1256 (1975)
(taxpayer unsuccessfully urging that entity was dummy corporation whose existence should
be ignored for tax purposes).
179 See, e.g., Britt v. United States, 431 F.2d 227, 232 (5th Cir. 1970) (government urg-
ing business activity insufficient to justify recognition as corporation); Lowndes v. United
States, 384 F.2d 635, 637 (4th Cir. 1967); Kimbrell v. Commissioner, 371 F.2d 897, 898 (5th
Cir. 1967) (government urging lack of business activity by two corporations); National In-
vestors Corp. v. Hoey, 144 F.2d 466, 467 (2d Cir. 1944) (government denying deduction to
corporation urging that corporation not engaged in business activity); Noonan v. Commis-
sioner, 52 T.C. 907, 909 (1969) (government urging that corporations with no business pur-
pose and that generated no income not be recognized as corporations for tax purpose), afl'd
per curiam, 451 F.2d 992 (9th Cir. 1971).
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nevertheless should be attributed to the real parties in interest, not
the corporation itself.80
The courts have developed several lines of authority to re-
spond to these arguments. Generally, the opinions evince a decided
reluctance on the part of the courts to disregard the corporate en-
tity; the norm in tax law, as in other areas of the law, is to honor
the corporate form.' 81 Nevertheless, both sides continue to advance
these arguments, and occasionally the arguments succeed. 82
Whether or not they succeed, the controversies have generated a
substantial amount of jurisprudence that neither tax counsel nor
the government can ignore. 8 3
180 See, e.g., National Carbide Corp. v. Commissioner, 336 U.S. 422, 426 (1949) (tax-
payer unsuccessfully urging that agency relationship existed and thus corporate entity
should not be taxed); Given v. Commissioner, 238 F.2d 579, 580 (8th Cir. 1956) (taxpayers
unsuccessfully urging that corporation was agent and thus without tax liability); Harrison
Property Management Co. v. United States, 475 F.2d 623, 624 (Ct. Cl. 1973) (taxpayers
unsuccessfully urging beneficial interest from property and right to receive tax advantages,
though title was passed to corporation), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1130 (1974); Carver v. United
States, 412 F.2d 233, 235 (Ct. Cl. 1969) (taxpayer unsuccessfully urging no corporate tax
liability where corporation never owned assets and never in receipt of income); Collins v.
United States, 386 F. Supp. 17, 19 (S.D. Ga. 1974) (taxpayers unsuccessfully urging that
corporation conducted no business activity and thus no corporate tax status), aff'd per
curiam, 514 F.2d 1282 (5th Cir. 1975).
181 See, e.g., Moline Properties, Inc. v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 436, 438-39 (1943)
(choice of corporate advantages of doing business requires acceptance of tax disadvantages)
(citing Burnet v. Commonwealth Improvement Co., 287 U.S. 415 (1932)); New Colonial Ice
Co. v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435, 442 (1934) (general rule that corporation and its shareholders
are deemed separate entities for tax purposes disregarded only in exceptional circum-
stances); Red Carpet Car Wash, Inc. v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 676, 685 (1980) (generally,
taxpayer who chooses to incorporate is bound by consequences of that choice, including tax
consequences); Bolger v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 760, 766 (1973) (corporations organized to
avoid state tax law restrictions on loans undoubtedly viable, separate entities for tax
purposes).
18'2 See, e.g., Valley Fin., Inc. v. United States, 629 F.2d 162, 166, 171-72 (D.C. Cir.
1980) (IRS convinced court that brokerage firm should not be treated as separate entity),
cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1018 (1981); Lowndes v. United States, 384 F.2d 635, 637-38 (4th Cir.
1967) (government convinced court that corporate form was merely form, not substance);
Jackson v. Commissioner, 233 F.2d 289, 291 (2d Cir. 1956) (taxpayer succeeded in convinc-
ing court to disregard corporate entity); Sellers v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 305, 313-
14 (1977) (taxpayer succeeded in convincing court to disregard corporate entity), aff'd, 592
F.2d 227 (4th Cir. 1979); Miller, The Nominee Conundrum: The Live Dummy is Dead, But
the Dead Dummy Should Live!, 34 TAx L. REv. 213, 228-29 & n.33 (1979) (citing number of
cases in which corporate form has been disregarded). But see Miller, supra, at 229 & n.34
(citing unsuccessful attempts by both government and taxpayers to have corporate form
disregarded).
183 See generally Baker & Rotham, supra note 15, at 1256-57 (discussing nominee and
agency theories for disregarding corporate form); Miller, supra note 182, at 220 (classifica-
tion should be determined by substance rather than form); Note, The Use of Corporations
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The question in these cases has been whether, notwithstand-
ing compliance with state law requirements for incorporation, the
courts should disregard the corporate entity and look to someone
else, usually the shareholders, as being the taxpayers.'" For pur-
poses of analysis, the cases can be divided into three groups. The
first group of cases is headed by a landmark 1943 Supreme Court
case, Moline Properties, Inc. v. Commissioner.'85 According to Mo-
line, the corporate entity should be respected for tax purposes as
long as it serves a business purpose or engages in business
activities. s6
The second group of cases involves the argument, made mostly
by taxpayers, that in certain circumstances a corporation is merely
an agent for someone else, usually the shareholders. 18 7 In these
cases, the taxpayer typically asserts that because the corporation is
merely an agent, the income tax consequences generated by its ac-
tivities should be attributed to whomever its principal happens to
be.8 s This argument has been used frequently by real estate inves-
tors who, for various nontax reasons, convey bare legal title in real
estate to a corporation, but retain the beneficial ownership in the
property for themselves. 8 9 Recent cases show sharp disagreement
in Real Estate Transactions: Judicial Acceptance of the Agency Theory, 8 J. CORP. L. 361,
361-63 (1983) (discussing tax classification for real estate corporations) [hereinafter cited as
Note, The Use of Corporations]; Note, The Business Purpose Doctrine: The Effects of Mo-
tive on Federal Income Tax Liability, 49 FORDHAM L. REV. 1078, 1082 (1981) (motive behind
incorporation relevant to tax classification).
164 See, e.g., Moline Properties, Inc. v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 436, 438 (1943) (taxing
of corporation); Harrison Property Management Co. v. United States, 475 F.2d 623, 626 (Ct.
Cl. 1973) (taxing of corporation), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1130 (1974); Britt v. United States,
431 F.2d 227, 231 (5th Cir. 1970) (recognition of corporation as separate entity).
185 319 U.S. 436 (1943).
186 Id. at 438-39; see infra notes 200-204 and accompanying text.
187 See, e.g., National Carbide Corp. v. Commissioner, 336 U.S. 422, 426-27 (1949);
Moncrief v. United States, 730 F.2d 276, 280 (5th Cir. 1984); Roccaforte v. Commissioner,
708 F.2d 986, 989 (5th Cir. 1983), rev'g 77 T.C. 263 (1981); Jones v. Commissioner, 640 F.2d
745, 746 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 965 (1981).
'88 See, e.g., National Carbide, 336 U.S. at 426-27 (wholly owned subsidiary acting as
agent of parent corporation argued that percentage of profits turned over to parent should
be taxable only to parent); Moncrief, 730 F.2d at 278-79 (corporation created to borrow
money as agent or nominee of partnership); Roccaforte, 708 F.2d at 987-88 (corporation
organized as agency of partnership to avoid usury laws).
'189 See, e.g., Roccaforte, 708 F.2d at 987 (partners converted title of property to corpo-
ration but reserved beneficiary interest to themselves); Jones, 640 F.2d at 748-49 (title to
partnership property in corporate name); Harrison Property Management Co. v. United
States, 475 F.2d 623, 624 (Ct. Cl. 1973) (partnership placed title to oil leases in name of
management corporation but retained beneficial ownership), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1130
(1974).
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as to the circumstances that must exist for this argument to suc-
ceed.190 The leading case is a 1949 Supreme Court case, National
Carbide Corp. v. Commissioner,19' which is discussed in a later
section.
The cases in the third group are lumped together mostly for
the sake of convenience. In these cases, the government has relied
on a potpourri of common-law tax principles in disregarding the
corporate entity, including fraud and the assignment of income,
step transaction, tax avoidance, substance over form, and business
purpose doctrines. 192 For example, courts have sometimes disre-
garded the corporate entity at the behest of the government when
the corporation had no purpose except to avoid taxes. 93 The most
famous case in this group is probably Gregory v. Helvering,94 also
discussed below. Analysis of cases within this group can be diffi-
cult, because courts sometimes inextricably intertwine these doc-
trines with each other and with the Moline and National Carbide
rules. 95 Some opinions discuss statutory tax avoidance rules, such
as those contained in sections 269 and 482 of the Code, in addition
to common law tax principles. 96
'go Compare Ourisman v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 171, 181 (1984) (application of six in-
dicia of agency established in National Carbide), vacated, 760 F.2d 541 (4th Cir. 1985) and
Roccaforte, 77 T.C. at 285-87 (fact that corporation owned by principal need not defeat
claim that corporation is true nontaxable corporate agent) with Roccaforte, 708 F.2d at 989-
90 (arms-length relations between corporation and principal mandatory for finding corpora-
tion to be true nontaxable corporate agent).
191 336 U.S. 422 (1949).
192 See, e.g., Moline Properties, Inc. v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 436, 459 (1943) (fraud);
Higgins v. Smith, 308 U.S. 473, 478 (1940) (assignment of income); Lowndes v. United
States, 384 F.2d 635, 637 (4th Cir. 1967) (step transaction); Haberman Farms, Inc. v. Com-
missioner, 305 F.2d 787, 793 (8th Cir. 1962) (tax avoidance); Red Carpet Car Wash, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 73 T.C. 676, 684 (1980) (substance over form). See generally J. MERTENS,
supra note 96, at §§ 38.10, 38.11 (courts will not hesitate to look past form in these
circumstances).
19 See, e.g., Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469-70 (1935) (court finding sole pur-
pose to be avoidance of taxes); Haberman Farms, Inc. v. United States, 305 F.2d 787, 793
(8th Cir. 1962) (court finding corporate form with distinct tax purpose but no reality beyond
lessening of tax burdens); Aldon Homes, Inc. v. Commissioner, 33 T.C. 582, 597 (1959) (cor-
porations found to be organized solely to obtain tax benefit and thus not given recognition
for tax purposes).
194 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
95 See, e.g., Aldon Homes, Inc. v. Commissioner, 33 T.C. 582, 596-97 (1959) (various
common law tax concepts applied for recognition of corporation as viable business entity).
19 See, e.g., Foglesong v. Commissioner, 621 F.2d 865, 869-72 (7th Cir. 1980) (§ 482
available to prevent tax evasion or clearly reflect controlled taxpayer's income); Peter Pan
Seafoods, Inc. v. United States, 20 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) 5080, 5084-86 (W.D. Wash. 1967) (sec-
tion 269 precluded recovery of tax refund); Keller v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 1014, 1022-23
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The Business Purpose/Business Activity Test
Sometimes a taxpayer argues that a corporation should be
considered completely nonexistent for tax purposes. The taxpayer
in such a case desires to have the tax consequences attributable to
corporate operations passed through to the shareholders. 197 De-
spite occasional judicial incantations of state law reasons for pierc-
ing the corporate veil, for example, that the corporation is a mere
"dummy" or "alter ego" for its shareholders,198 most of these argu-
ments fail;199 they cannot pass the test of Moline Properties, Inc.
v. Commissioner.'" In Moline, the taxpayer sought to have the
gain attributable to the sale of corporate property by the corpora-
tion taxed to the sole shareholder, instead of to the corporation.201
The shareholder wanted the "corporate existence ignored as
merely fictitious." 20 2 The Supreme Court responded:
The doctrine of corporate entity fills a useful purpose in busi-
(1981) (section 482 applied to one-man personal service corporation), afl'd, 723 F.2d 58
(10th Cir. 1983); see also Comment, supra note 76, at 521-34 (sections 482 and 269A
designed to prevent avoidance or evasion).
"7 See, e.g., Moline Properties, Inc. v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 436, 436 (1943) (peti-
tioner sought tax treatment of gains on sales of corporate property as shareholder's gains);
Ogiony v. Commissioner, 617 F.2d 15, 16 (2d Cir.) (when corporation formed merely as fi-
nancing vehicle, deduction of operating loss claimed to be right of partners), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 900 (1980); Skarda v. Commissioner, 250 F.2d 429, 433 (10th Cir. 1957) (partner-
ship created corporation to run newspaper and claimed that partners were entitled to de-
ductions for losses incurred by newspaper).
108 See, e.g., Britt v. United States, 431 F.2d 227, 233 (5th Cir. 1970) (veil pierced when
corporation organized to contravene policies of Internal Revenue Code); Shaw Constr. Co. v.
Commissioner, 323 F.2d 316, 319 (9th Cir. 1963) (multiple corporations not organized for
business purpose held "unreal" and "sham"); Kittle v. Commissioner, 19 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H)
976, 978 (W.D. Tenn. 1967) (dummy corporation, alter ego for shareholders without any
other business function, may be disregarded by taxpayer).
19' See, e.g., Moncrief v. United States, 730 F.2d 276, 280 (5th Cir. 1985) ("disregard"
theory met with little success in courts); Foglesong v. Commissioner, 621 F.2d -865, 869 (7th
Cir. 1980) (inappropriate to weigh "business purposes" against "tax avoidance motives" to
determine whether corporate form should be disregarded); Ogiony v. Commissioner, 617
F.2d 14, 16 (2d Cir.) (corporation taxed unless "purely passive dummy" or used for tax
avoidance), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 900 (1980); Evans v. Commissioner, 557 F.2d 1095, 1098
(5th Cir. 1977) (affirmed lower court's holding that corporation was separate entity for tax
purposes); Collins v. United States, 386 F. Supp. 17, 19-20 (S.D. Ga. 1974) (individuals can-
not adopt corporate form and ignore its tax consequences), aff'd, 514 F.2d 1282 (5th Cir.
1975) (per curiam); Strong v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 12, 24-25 (1976) (degree of corporate
purpose and activity giving rise to separate taxable entity extremely low), aff'd without
opinion, 553 F.2d 94 (2d Cir. 1977).
200 319 U.S. 436, 438-39 (1943).
201 See id. at 436.
202 Id.
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ness life. Whether the purpose be to gain an advantage under the
law of the state of incorporation or to avoid or to comply with the
demands of creditors or to serve the creator's personal or undis-
closed convenience, so long as that purpose is the equivalent of
business activity or is followed by the carrying on of business by
the corporation, the corporation remains a separate taxable
entity.203
This language begs for clarification of what "purposes" amount to
the "equivalent of business activity." Numerous later decisions,
however, have avoided the difficult analysis that such a clarifica-
tion would entail. Lower courts instead have taken an easier route.
They have interpreted Moline as dictating an alternative test: the
presence of either a business purpose or business activity will re-
sult in recognition of the corporation as a separate taxable
entity.204
It is especially difficult to concoct a reason for incorporating,
except perhaps for tax avoidance, that does not amount to a busi-
ness purpose. It would seem, therefore, that a literal interpretation
of the business purpose prong of the Moline test would result in
every corporation being recognized for tax purposes, unless it was
formed purely for tax avoidance (in which case government, not
the taxpayer, would want it disregarded).20 5 The cases are not
quite that literal, but they are close. For example, the Tax Court
has held that organization of a corporation for the purpose of
avoiding state usury laws is a business purpose that requires the
recognition of the corporation as a separate taxable entity.20 6 Since
use of the corporation allows the owners to obtain financing that
they could not obtain as individuals or partners, the corporations
could not be considered as fictional or non-existent for tax pur-
poses. In this type of case, anybody not versed in tax law would
consider the corporations as empty shells that do not operate busi-
203 Id. at 438-39 (foonote omitted).
204 See Carver v. United States, 412 F.2d 233, 236-37 (Ct. Cl. 1969); Preferred Proper-
ties, Inc. v. Commissioner, 35 T.C.M. (CCH) 68, 70 (1976); Rogers v. Commissioner, 34
T.C.M. (CCH) 1254, 1256 (1975); Bertane, supra note 16, at 745. The volume of business
activity is not determinative in the question of whether a proper business purpose exists.
See Britt v. United States, 431 F.2d 227, 237 (5th Cir. 1970); Horwood, The Corporate
Nominee/General Partner, 37 INST. ON FED. TAX'N 14-1 to 14-25 (1979).
205 See Horwood, supra note 204, at 14-1 to 14-25.
206 See Sarkisian v. Commissioner, 43 T.C.M. (CCH) 1074, 1078 (1982); Strong v. Com-
missioner, 66 T.C. 12, 24 (1976), afl'd without opinion, 553 F.2d 94 (2d Cir. 1977); Bolger v.
Commissioner, 59 T.C. 760, 766 (1973).
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nesses- as fronts to avoid archaic state statutes. In another case,
the corporate shell was used to protect against the disruptive effect
that the death of a partner would have had on efficient manage-
ment of the enterprise and to decrease the need for multiple signa-
tures for routine operations.0 7 Although every pertinent document
presented to the court indicated that the corporation was merely a
conduit, the corporation was held to be a taxable entity.20 s
Although courts could end the inquiry upon finding a business
purpose for the corporation, they nevertheless usually continue the
analysis by investigating whether or not the corporation engaged in
any business activity.20 9 Shortly after Moline, Judge Learned Hand
gave what remains today the best explanation of the business ac-
tivity test:
[T]o be a separate jural person for purposes of taxation, a corpo-
ration must engage in some industrial, commercial, or other activ-
ity besides avoiding taxation: in other words, the term "corpora-
tion" will be interpreted to mean a corporation which does some
"business" in the ordinary meaning ; and that escaping taxation
is not "business" in the ordinary meaning.210
Although business activity is required for recognition of the corpo-
ration as a taxable entity, that activity may be minimal. Indeed,
the degree of corporate purpose activity mandating corporation
status for the taxable entity is extremely low. 211 Recent cases have
indicated that even ministerial acts constitute "business activities"
under Moline.212
207 See Harrison Property Management Co. v. United States, 475 F.2d 623, 626 (Ct. Cl.
1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1130 (1974).
18 See id. at 624-25.
20' See, e.g., Sarkisian v. Commissioner, 43 T.C.M. (CCH) 1074, 1078-79 (1982) (corpo-
ration engaged in business activities consistent with its purpose recognized as separate taxa-
ble entity); Strong v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 12, 24-25 (1976) (low degree of corporate pur-
pose and activity sufficient to require recognition as taxable entity), aff'd without opinion,
553 F.2d 94 (2d Cir. 1977); Preferred Properties, Inc. v. Commissioner, 35 T.C.M. (CCH) 68,
70 (1976) (taxpayer had bona fide business purpose and carried on significant business ac-
tivities); Rogers v. Commissioner, 34 T.C.M. (CCH) 1254, 1257 (1975) (business activities
included maintaining bank accounts, lending money, and filing corporate statements and
reports).
210 National Investors Corp. v. Hoey, 144 F.2d 466, 468 (2d Cir. 1944).
"n Britt v. United States, 431 F.2d 227, 237 (5th Cir. 1970); Sarkisian v. Commissioner,
43 T.C.M. (CCH) 1074, 1078 (1982); Strong v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 12, 24 (1976), aff'd
without opinion, 553 F.2d 94 (2d Cir. 1977).
2'2 See, e.g., Ogiony v. Commissioner, 617 F.2d 14, 15-16 (2d Cir.) (corporation held
title to property to obtain financing but all expenses were paid and rental incomes received
by partnership), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 900 (1980); Collins v. United States, 386 F. Supp 17,
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It is tempting to conclude that Moline has settled the area,
constructing impassable barriers for litigants who want a corpora-
tion to be disregarded completely for tax purposes. This conclusion
is most accurate when it is the taxpayer who wants the corporation
to be disregarded. The taxpayer has succeeded in a few rare in-
stances, and these few successes may be mere aberrations.
The successes can be divided roughly into four groups. The
first group is headed by the most prominent of the cases in favor of
the taxpayer, Paymer v. Commissioner.21 3 In Paymer, the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit held that a corporation created by
two partners, solely to remove partnership property from the reach
of the partnership creditors, should be disregarded for tax pur-
poses.2 14 The court characterized the corporation as a "passive
dummy" that did nothing but hold title to real estate; the court
found no business purpose because the corporation served only to
deter creditors.215 However, a strong argument could be made that
deterrence of creditors is indeed a business purpose. Decided in
1945, Paymer predated those cases holding that the Moline busi-
ness purpose/business activity test is conjunctive in nature.216 Al-
though the corporation in Paymer held legal title to property, it
never performed any business activity.217 It is therefore distin-
guishable from most of the modern cases, which almost always find
business activity in addition to a business purpose.218 No one has
called Paymer bad law, however, and courts and commentators
19 (S.D. Ga. 1974) (corporation formed to avoid state usury restrictions and secured only
one mortgage), aff'd, 514 F.2d 1282 (5th Cir. 1975) (per curiam).
23 150 F.2d 334 (2d Cir. 1945).
214 See id. at 336-37.
215 See id. at 337.
216 Apparently the first case to hold that the Moline Properties test is conjunctive-i.e.,
requiring both business purpose and business activity-was Jackson v. Commissioner, 233
F.2d 289 (2d Cir. 1956). In Jackson, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found a
clear business purpose, but insufficient business activity, when a corporation was formed for
the sole purpose of protecting the taxpayer's spouse from the taxpayer's creditors. See id. at
289-90; Bertane, supra note 16, at 745.
21 See Paymer, 150 F.2d at 337.
218 See, e.g., Sarkisian v. Commissioner, 43 T.C.M. (CCH) 1078, 1079 (1982) (after cor-
porate purpose abandoned and existence of activities continued, court found sufficient activ-
ities and purpose for corporation to be considered taxable entity); Strong v. Commissioner,
66 T.C. 12, 24 (1976) (corporation's purpose and activities sufficient to require recognition of
separate ownership of property and, a fortiori, existence as taxable entity), afId without
opinion, 553 F.2d 94 (2d Cir. 1977). See generally Horwood, supra note 204, at 14-2 to 14-28
(on the Moline business purpose/activity test).
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continue to cite it.2 19 More importantly, a 1980 tax court opinion,
Red Carpet Car Wash, Inc. v. Commissioner, 220 relied on Paymer
in determining that a corporation was not a separate taxable en-
tity.221 The corporation in Red Carpet was a front for a Ford deal-
ership that had invested in a tax shelter and wanted to conceal its
investment from Ford's main office, which frowned on such invest-
ments. The corporation was no more than a nominee for furnishing
a name for the partnership; it engaged in no business activity
whatsoever.22
In the second group of cases, courts have used almost an in-
verted assignment of income rationale to find for the taxpayer. Al-
though the taxpayers in these cases created corporations, the
shareholders personally operated the businesses while the corpora-
tions did nothing. Because only the shareholders operated the
businesses, the tax consequences of the businesses were attributed
to the shareholders, not to the corporations. 2
The third group contains only a few modern cases. In these
cases, although the corporations were deemed to have been sepa-
rate entities in the past, they had since ceased to conduct any busi-
ness activity or to have any business purpose. They had become
mere conduits. The courts in each case disregarded the corpora-
tions for the years after they had stopped engaging in any
business.224
2,9 See, e.g., Britt v. United States, 431 F.2d 227, 236 (5th Cir. 1970) (Paymer reflects
judicial reluctance to disregard corporate form where National Investors "business" test
satisfied); Red Carpet Car Wash, Inc. v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 676, 686 (1980) (used
Paymer in determining whether corporation was mere nominee); Strong v. Commissioner, 66
T.C. 12, 23 (1976) (Paymer reflects Second Circuit's focus on business purpose with respect
to property in question), aff'd without opinion, 553 F.2d 94 (2d Cir. 1977); Horwood, supra
note 204, at 14-1, 14-25 to 14-26; Miller, supra note 182, at 241; Note, The Use of Corpora-
tions, supra note 183, at 367 n.43.
220 73 T.C. 676 (1980).
221 See id. at 686-87 (1980).
222 See id. at 685.
223 See, e.g., Kimbrell v. Commissioner, 371 F.2d 897, 901-02 (5th Cir. 1967) (type and
amount of business activities insufficient for finding of separate taxable entity); Kittle v.
United States, 19 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) 976, 978-79 (W.D. Tenn. 1967) (corporation operated as
sole proprietorship entitled shareholder to depreciation deduction); Red Carpet Car Wash,
Inc. v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 676, 685-87 (1980) (corporation which engaged in no activity
with regard to partnership not entitled to deduction for partnership losses).
224 See Haberman Farms, Inc. v. United States, 305 F.2d 787, 793 (8th Cir. 1962); Min-
nesota Farm Bureau Sec., Inc. v. United States, 10 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) 6102, 6104 (D. Minn.
1962).
In Sarkisian v. Commissioner, 43 T.C.M. (CCH) 1074 (1982), the Tax Court refused to
disregard the corporation because the corporation still served a legitimate nontax purpose.
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Finally, two district court opinions have disregarded the cor-
porate entity at the taxpayer's insistence, citing only pre-Moline
authority.225 These cases should not be accorded any precedential
weight, but they show that the government does not always win.
When use of the corporate form produces tax disadvantages
for closely-held enterprises and their owners, tax planners must
tell their clients that they cannot readily disassociate themselves
from the corporate form and have it disregarded for tax purposes.
Neither the planners nor their clients should ever expect that they
will be capable of persuading the government or a court that their
corporation should be disregarded. They might be better off using
a proprietorship or partnership, despite the problem of expanded
exposure to personal liability. They might be able to incorporate
and elect to use the partnership-like tax treatment afforded by
Id. at 1078-79. In the first four of the five years at issue, the corporation borrowed money,
held title, mortgaged property, executed several leases, and accepted several rent checks. Id.
at 1078. The court here was correct that the corporation was not inactive, as claimed by the
taxpayers. In the fifth year, however, the corporation seems to have done little more than
reconvey the property to the beneficial owners. See id. at 1077, 1079. Thus, it is perhaps
surprising that the court considered it a taxable entity for that year. The court listed the
following factors in support of its legal conclusion: (1) the corporate charter granted the
corporation broader powers than the mere ability to obtain financing for one parcel of real
estate; (2) the beneficial owners of the real estate made no effort to liquidate the corpora-
tion, even though the corporation supposedly had no reason for its continued existence; (3)
when notified by state officials that the corporation was about to be dissolved for failure to
file state franchise tax returns, the owners of the real estate filed the returns to prevent the
dissolution; and (4) the use of the corporate form "carried with it the usual baggage," in-
cluding limited liability. Id. at 1079. The court stated that the presence of limited liability
was "not determinative," but significant. Id. The second and third factors, which suggest an
argument akin to an estoppel, might be sufficient to justify a determination that the corpo-
ration should not be disregarded. However, the first and the fourth factors-the broad pur-
pose clause in the charter and limited liability-seem legalistic. The owners of the real es-
tate had personally guaranteed the mortgage note, see id., and it can be presumed that the
mortgagee will be the owner's sole, or at least major, creditor. The limited liability accorded
by the corporate form is mostly theoretical when the shareholders personally guarantee
large corporate debts. The broad purpose clause is likewise unimportant to a nominee cor-
poration that does nothing except to hold title to real estate. In Sarkisian, the clause was no
doubt merely a minute, although unfortunate, drafting error by an attorney, who failed to
tailor the corporate charter to the needs of his client. Nothing in Sarkisian remotely sug-
gests that the corporation was about to embark upon any active trade or business. Thus,
though Sarkisian did not suggest that Haberman Farms and Minnesota Farm Bureau
should be overruled, the legalistic tenor of the Sarkisian opinion contrasts sharply with
those earlier decisions, and perhaps evinces a reluctance on the part of the Tax Court to
accept an agreement that a corporation whose original business had ended should be disre-
garded for federal tax purposes.
225 See Baltimore Aircoil Co. v. United States, 333 F. Supp. 705, 710-11 (D. Md. 1971);
Dobyns-Taylor Hardware Co. v. United States, 278 F. Supp. 538, 542-44 (E.D. Tenn. 1967).
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the liberalized Subchapter S provisions. They might even be able
to convince a court that the corporation is an agent for the share-
holders, an argument finding increasing support and achieving
objectives similar to those sought by taxpayers in the Moline-type
cases. If shareholders of a close corporation are engaged in a dis-
pute with the government and they can formulate a plausible argu-
ment in favor of disregarding the corporation, they probably
should not forego at least making the argument. Although it might
be frivolous to go to court with only that argument, there are
enough cases in favor of taxpayers to show that success is not com-
pletely impossible.
The Corporation as an Agent or Nominee
Numerous nontax advantages may impel the owners of a
closely held enterprise to select the corporate form. They may
want to use a corporation to limit personal liability,226 to avoid re-
strictive usury laws 227 or government regulation,228 to facilitate es-
tate planning,229 to avoid personal liability on mortgage indebted-
ness,230 to conceal title from personal creditors,21 to simplify title
228 See, e.g., Given v. Commissioner, 238 F.2d 579, 581 (8th Cir. 1956) (corporate form
chosen to avoid risk of suits against owners of enterprise); Siegel v. Commissioner, 45 T.C.
566, 569 (1966) (corporation organized to insulate personal assets of investor and protect his
reputation).
227 See, e.g., Roccaforte v. Commissioner, 708 F.2d 986, 987 (5th Cir. 1983) (lender re-
quired incorporation of lendee when state usury laws did not cover corporations); Jones v.
Commissioner, 640 F.2d 745, 747 (5th Cir.) (loan conditioned on borrower's incorporation to
avoid state usury laws), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 965 (1981); Ogiony v. Commissioner, 617 F.2d
14, 15-16 (2d Cir.) (partnership incorporated because it could not obtain loan at other than
usurious rates), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 900 (1980); Strong v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 12, 14
(1976) (corporation formed to obtain loans to which state usury laws would not apply), aff'd
without opinion, 553 F.2d 94 (2d Cir. 1977); see also Hoffman, supra note 13, at 11 ("the
most prevalent reason for the use of a [nominee] corporation is the circumvention of state
usury laws").
228 See, e.g., Elot H. Raffety Farms, Inc. v. United States, 511 F.2d 1234, 1236 (8th Cir.)
(Mexican corporation formed by United States partners to avoid Mexican law prohibiting
farming operations in Mexico by foreign nationals), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 834 (1975); Dallas
Downtown Dev. Co. v. Commissioner, 12 T.C. 114, 123-24 (1949) (intermediate corporation
formed by Texas bank to circumvent Texas banking law restriction on amount banking
companies could spend on bank buildings).
229 See, e.g., Commissioner v. State-Adams Corp., 283 F.2d 395, 396 (2d Cir. 1960) (cor-
poration formed to allow for smooth property transfer in case of partner's death); Harrison
Property Management Co. v. United States, 475 F.2d 623, 624 (Ct. Cl. 1973) (corporation
formed to provide for efficient management in event of death of partner), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 1130 (1974).
220 See, e.g., Love v. United States, 96 F. Supp. 919, 920 (Ct. Cl. 1951) (title to property
on which residence was to be erected transferred to corporation).
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transfer,3 2 or to achieve innumerable other benefits.233 The use of
the partnership form may produce far better federal tax conse-
quences, however. Generally speaking, for federal tax purposes a
partnership is a conduit that passes the tax consequences of busi-
ness operations through to the individual partners, who report
them on their own personal tax returns.23 4 Partnership tax conse-
quences are especially attractive in the first years of a business,
when the business frequently generates large deductions that can
be passed through to the partners to shelter other income .23  The
taxpayer is thus presented with a dilemma: tax factors heavily
favor the use of a partnership, but nontax factors favor the use of a
corporation.
The solution proposed by many attorneys, especially for real
estate ventures, has been the "nominee corporation. '236 The inves-
tors form a partnership and acquire the property to be developed
in the partnership name. They then form a corporation and, while
retaining beneficial ownership in the partnership, transfer record
legal title of the property to the corporation. The partners make it
clear to lenders (and anyone else with a need to know) that the
partnership is the real owner of the property, and that the corpora-
tion is a mere nominee for the partnership, nothing more than a
vehicle for holding record title. Thus, the corporation is merely the
agent of the partnership, with no powers of its own, acting only at
the instruction of the partnership. The partners hope that the cor-
poration will be respected for whatever nontax purposes it is cre-
ated, but will be treated as a conduit for federal tax purposes.
Thus, although the corporation at some point participates nomi-
nally in developing the project, for example, holding record title to
the property, the partners, who are usually shareholders, neverthe-
less treat themselves as owners of the project for federal income
231 See, e.g., Paymer v. Commissioner, 150 F.2d 334, 335-36 (2d Cir. 1945) (corporation
formed to protect partnership assets from attachment by creditors of partner).
2'2 See, e.g., Tomlinson v. Miles, 316 F.2d 710, 711 (5th Cir.) (corporation formed to
avoid complexities in transferring property owned by large group of individuals), cert. de-
nied, 375 U.S. 828 (1963).
233 See, e.g., Taylor v. Commissioner, 445 F.2d 455, 456 (lst Cir. 1971) (corporation
formed to conceal identity of politically active individual submitting zoning application);
Britt v. United States, 431 F.2d 227, 229 (5th Cir. 1970) (corporation formed to provide
partners' children with additional income and functional interest in business).
134 See I.R.C. § 702 (1982).
135 See Hoffman, supra note 13, at 10; Harvard Note, supra note 27, at 745.
236 Hoffman, supra note 13, at 11.
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tax purposes. Thus, the partners report the gains and losses real-
ized from the project on their own tax returns, claiming deductions
for interest, taxes, and depreciation, and capitalizing other expend-
itures that increase their basis in the project. At the soonest practi-
cable moment, the partnership liquidates the corporation with title
to the property reverting to the partnership. Because the partners
were never divested of beneficial ownership, they do not feel com-
pelled to report the liquidation as a taxable event.237
Except for two narrow (and perhaps anomalous) revenue rul-
ings in the mid-1970's,2 38 the government generally has posited
that, because the nominee corporation has a role in developing the
project, it is the actual taxpayer, and therefore should report any
income or gains and deduct any expenses or losses realized from
the project.23 If the government wins, the expenses and losses
from the project are not passed through to the partners, who likely
have income from other sources against which the project deduc-
tions can be offset.240
Although judicial responses have not been fully consistent, the
opinions nevertheless evidence some common generalizations. Most
decisions reject claims made by taxpayers that a corporation
should be deemed a mere agent of its shareholders and that its
income or losses should be attributed to the shareholders.241 The
23 See generally Stogel & Jones, Straw and Nominee Corporations in Real Estate Tax
Shelter Transactions, 1976 WASH. U.L.Q. 403, 404-05 (discussing straw corporations and
their treatment by IRS).
238 See Rev. Rul. 7626, 1976-1 C.B. 10; Rev. Rul. 75-31, 1975-1 C.B. 10; Miller, supra
note 182, at 261-63; Note, The Use of Corporations, supra note 183, at 361-63.
23 See, e.g., Vaughn v. United States, 740 F.2d 941, 946-47 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (holding
that although corporation held title to property as agent of owners, facts at bar failed to
reveal such status); Harrison Property Management Co. v. United States, 475 F.2d 623, 623-
26 (Ct. Cl. 1973) (profits derived from property held by nominee corporation taxable to
corporation rather than individuals retaining beneficial ownership), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
1130 (1974); Taylor v. Commissioner, 445 F.2d 455, 457 (1st Cir. 1971) (finding that nominee
corporation did more than merely hold title to land and was therefore more than straw
corporation).
210 See Baker & Rothman, supra note 15, at 1264.
241 See, e.g., National Carbide Corp. v. Commissioner, 336 U.S. 422, 438 (1949) (corpo-
ration managing property for owner held not true agent, owner could not escape tax conse-
quences of corporate form); Moline Properties, Inc. v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 436, 440-41
(1943) (corporation wholly owned by one stockholder not treated as agent of stockholder);
Vaughn v. United States, 740 F.2d 941, 946-47 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (although corporation may
hold property as mere agent, under facts involved it did not); Elot H. Raffety Farms, Inc. v.
United States, 511 F.2d 1234, 1239 (8th Cir.) (taxpayers who maintained that corporation
was not a mere agent to escape liability could not later gain tax advantage by claiming it
was an agent), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 834 (1975).
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rejection generally is accompanied by a homily for impudent share-
holders, such as: "[t]he choice of the advantages of incorporation
to do business . . . required the acceptance of the tax disadvan-
tages."242 Recent decisions from the Tax Court and several other
federal courts, however, have accepted agency arguments made by
taxpayers. 4 3
It is easier to catalog the results of the agency cases than it is
to find satisfactory analysis within the opinions. The problem
stems partly from the ill-fitting approach some courts have taken
to nominee corporation problems. Often the courts have looked to
see whether the activities of the corporation are so insufficient that
it should be disregarded for tax purposes. 244 Typically, the courts
have questioned whether the real owners of the property derive
any advantage from using the corporation.245 If they do, these
courts have concluded, the corporation is a taxable entity and the
tax consequences generated from owning the property are attribu-
table to it. 246 This analysis is virtually a replication of the Moline
business purpose/business activity test, and displays a misconcep-
tion of the issue.247 The Moline test was designed to determine
242 Moline Properties, Inc. v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 436, 439 (1943). The Moline
homily has been frequently cited. See, e.g., Harrison Property Management Co. v. United
States, 475 F.2d 623, 626 (Ct. Cl. 1973) ("choice of the advantages of incorporation ...
requires 'the acceptance of the tax disadvantages' ") (quoting Moline, 319 U.S. at 439), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 1130 (1974); Collins v. United States, 386 F. Supp. 17, 19 (S.D. Ga. 1974)
(emphasized Moline's corporate entity doctrine) (quoting Moline, 319 U.S. at 438-39), aff'd,
514 F.2d 1282 (5th Cir. 1975) (per curiam).
24' See Moncrief v. United States, 730 F.2d 276, 277, 285-86 (5th Cir. 1984); Raphan v.
United States, 52 A.F.T.R.2d (PH) 83-5987, 83-5993 (Ct. Cl. 1983); Scholsberg v. United
States, 47 A.F.T.R.2d (PH) 81-1208, 81-1211 (E.D. Va. 1981); Ourisman v. Commissioner, 82
T.C. 171, 184 (1984); Roccaforte v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 263, 278-79 (1981), rev'd, 708 F.2d
986 (5th Cir. 1983).
2" See, e.g., Harrison Property Management Co. v. United States, 475 F.2d 623, 627
(Ct. Cl. 1973) (activities of corporation too substantial to be disregarded), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 1130 (1974); Taylor v. Commissioner, 445 F.2d 455, 457 (1st Cir. 1971) (business activi-
ties of corporation too extensive to support claim that corporation acted as mere straw); see
Bertane, supra note 16, at 762; Kurtz & Kopp, Taxability of Straw Corporations in Real
Estate Transactions, 22 TAX LAW 647, 648 (1969); Miller, supra note 182, at 240-54; Note,
The Use of Corporations, supra note 183, at 364-67.
"I See, e.g., Collins v. United States, 386 F. Supp. 17, 20-21 (S.D. Ga. 1974) (corpora-
tion formed to avoid state usury laws), aff'd, 514 F.2d 1282 (5th Cir. 1975)(per curiam); see
Kurtz & Kopp, supra note 244, at 648.
24 See supra note 245.
247 See Kurtz & Kopp, supra note 244, at 650; Miller, supra note 182, at 251-52; Note,
The Use of Corporations, supra note 183, at 367-68; see also Strong v. Commissioner, 66
T.C. 12, 22-23 (1976) (noted criticism of courts' prevailing approach to nominee cases, but
decided case under Moline business purpose/business activity test), afl'd without opinion,
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whether a corporation should be considered as a distinct taxpayer,
separate and apart from its shareholders. It is quite possible for
one taxpayer, be it a corporation or an individual, to be an agent or
a nominee for another taxpayer.248 The dual status of taxpayer and
nominee or agent is not intrinsically inconsistent. Fortunately,
courts have begun to understand the difference between the argu-
ment that a corporation, though a taxable entity, is an agent, and
the argument that a corporation, because it has no business pur-
pose and does no business, is not even a taxable entity.249
The National Carbide Test
National Carbide Corp. v. Commissioner,250 a 1949 Supreme
Court decision, is still the leading authority on the agency issue.251
In National Carbide, a parent corporation used four operating
subsidiaries to conduct its businesses.25 2 Each of the subsidiaries
signed a contract that designated it as agent for the parent and
required it to turn over all profits to the parent, minus a nominal
fee it retained for services rendered as agent.253 The subsidiaries
reported their fees as income, but claimed that the profits pro-
duced by the businesses they operated should be taxed to their
principal, the parent corporation.25 The Supreme Court declined
to honor the agent status sought by the subsidiaries. 25 The guise
of an agency relationship, the Court held, could not conceal what
was an anticipatory assignment of income; the income from run-
ning the businesses had to be taxed to the subsidiaries who had
553 F.2d 94 (2d Cir. 1977).
248 See, e.g., Snyder v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 785, 791 (1976) (individual holding title
to property was nominee for real owner); Estate of Connelly v. Commissioner, 34 T.C.M.
(CCH) 1429, 1433 (1975) (individual taxpayer holding legal title to property was merely
nominee for real owner); see Kurtz & Kopp, supra note 244, at 648; Miller, supra note 182,
at 223, 252.
19 See, e.g., Moncrief v. United States, 730 F.2d 276, 280 (5th Cir. 1984) (recognized
both agency theory and "disregard" theory); Roccaforte v. Commissioner, 708 F.2d 986, 988-
89 (5th Cir. 1983) (corporations, though taxable entities, may qualify as non-taxable agents);
Jones v. Commissioner, 640 F.2d 745, 750-51 (5th Cir.) (taxpayers argued that corporation
be recognized as such and also as agent for partnership), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 965 (1981).
2'0 336 U.S. 422 (1949).
21 See Vaughn v. United States, 740 F.2d 941, 946-47 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Moncrief v.
United States, 730 F.2d 276, 280 (5th Cir. 1984); Roccaforte v. Commissioner, 708 F.2d 986,
989-90 (5th Cir. 1983).
252 336 U.S. at 424.25.
253 Id. at 425.
214 Id. at 426-27.
255 Id. at 438.
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earned it.256 Despite the trappings of an agency relationship, the
Supreme Court saw nothing more than a normal parent-subsidiary
relationship-subsidiaries operating businesses and transmitting
profits to a parent.5
The result of National Carbide was sensible. If a corporation
operates a business, it should not be able to avoid the tax conse-
quences of its business activities by claiming that it is an agent for
its shareholders. All corporations could make that claim, for a cor-
poration is by nature a device or instrument for carrying on the
business of its shareholders. If the subsidiaries' argument in Na-
tional Carbide had been accepted, shareholders could opt into or
out of the corporate tax regime by designating or not designating
their corporations as agents, choosing whichever status produces
better tax consequences. The holding of National Carbide effec-
tively squelches any arguments that a corporation with an active
trade or business should be treated as an agent of its shareholders
for tax purposes. For close corporations with active trades or busi-
nesses, the price to pay for achieving agency status for their corpo-
ration would probably be unduly high anyway; certainly, the share-
holders would be shed of the protection of limited liability
accorded to them by the use of a corporate form.2 58
National Carbide nevertheless suggested that a corporation
might sometimes be treated as an agent or trustee for its share-
holders-principals and thereby avoid taxation in certain circum-
stances. 2"9 The Court proffered the following "relevant considera-
tions" in determining whether a "true agency" exists: "[w]hether
the corporation operates in the name and for the account of the
principal, binds the principal by its actions, transmits money re-
ceived to the principal, and whether receipt of income is attributa-
ble to the services of employees of the principal and to assets be-
longing to the principal." 280 In addition to these "relevant
factors," the court noted two characteristics that must exist for a
corporation to be a "true agent": first the relations of the corpora-
tion with its principal must not depend on the fact that it is owned
by the principal; and second, the business purpose of the corpora-
256 Id. at 436.
257 Id.
258 See generally Note, The Use of Corporations, supra note 183, at 384-85 (assump-
tion of agent's liabilities by principal is necessary evil of agency relationship).




tion must be to carry on the normal duties of an agent.26'
It is not difficult to set up an arrangement that meets Na-
tional Carbide's four "relevant factors." Reported decisions are
virtual formbooks for language to use in drafting documents that
create corporate nominees.26 2 The first of the required characteris-
tics, however, is not easily satisfied and is the focal point of current
controversy.
One interpretation of the first requirement is that the rela-
tionship between the principal and agent must be at arms-length
and independent.263 Obviously, the relationship between share-
holders and their close corporations is rarely arms-length and inde-
pendent. This especially restrictive interpretation has been used to
defeat attempts by shareholders to have their close corporations
treated as agents. 6 4 Whether or not this interpretation produces
good tax policy, it hardly seems to be consistent with the realities
of the business world: numerous principal-agent relationships are
not arms-length, and no urgent issue of social welfare demands
that they should be. A variation of this interpretation, slightly less
restrictive, is to test whether the agent would have made the agree-
ment if the principal were not its owner, and whether the principal
would have made the agreement if the agent was not under its con-
281 Id. In Roccaforte v. Commissioner, 708 F.2d 986, 989 (5th Cir. 1983), the Fifth Cir-
cuit renumbered National Carbide's four "relevant considerations" and two "required con-
ditions," listing them as six "conditions," or "factors." Id. Subsequent courts frequently
have adopted the Roccaforte method of numbering the factors. See, e.g., Moncrief v. United
States, 730 F.2d 276, 282-84 (5th Cir. 1984) (applied six Roccaforte factors in agency deter-
mination); Ourisman v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 171, 181-84 (1984) (applied National Car-
bide indicia of agency, as interpreted in Roccaforte).
282 See, e.g., Roccaforte v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 263, 270 (1981) (language evidencing
agency relationship indicated), rev'd, 708 F.2d 986 (5th Cir. 1983). The agreement, in Rocca-
forte, which was found by the court to create an agency relationship, included the following
provisions: a designation of the corporation as agent of the partnership; an affirmation that
the partners were the true owners of the property involved; a statement that the corporation
was formed merely to facilitate the acquisition, development, and financing of the property;
a disclaimer of ownership by the corporation; a statement that the owners would primarily
be responsible for all debts and that the corporation was held harmless for all liabilities; a
statement that the owners would be brought in as third party defendants in litigation
brought against the corporation; and an agreement that the corporation would not engage in
business activities other than those authorized by the owners. Id. See generally Hoffman,
supra note 13, at 12 (recommendations for drafting agreements).
28" See, e.g., Jones v. Commissioner, 640 F.2d 745, 755 (5th Cir.) (burden of proof with
respect to National Carbide standards not met for failure to produce evidence of indepen-
dent arms-length relationship), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 965 (1981).
284 See id.
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trol.265 In other words, the arrangement need not be arms-length in
fact, but its terms must match those that unrelated parties would
have reached in arms-length negotiations. Most current arrange-
ments, to be sure, would fail under this test, too; shareholders are
unlikely to convince a court that they would have entrusted their
property to a corporation that they did not own or control. More-
over, to make the transaction resemble an arms-length arrange-
ment, the shareholders would need to pay a fee to their own corpo-
ration for services rendered. 266 Besides being somewhat of a
charade, this requirement might exacerbate liquidity problems for
cash-strapped shareholders and their fledgling enterprises.
Recently, several courts have evinced an inclination to relax
the restrictive interpretations of National Carbide and have be-
come more receptive to agency arguments made by taxpayers. In
Moncrief v. United States,267 the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit held that a true agency relationship existed between a part-
nership (the beneficial owner of the real estate) and a corporation
(the legal owner of the real estate) when a twenty-five percent
partner, who dealt with the other partners at arms-length, both
operated the corporation and owned all of its shares.6 s In two re-
cent cases, Roccaforte v. Commissioner,'9 and Ourisman v. Com-
27missioner, 70 the Tax Court opined that the first "requirement" in
National Carbide is not really a requirement at all, but instead is
merely one of a variety of factors that a court should consider in
testing the purported agent status of the corporation.27 1 That is,
the Tax Court has held that taxpayers need not show that the
shareholders and the corporation dealt with each other at arms-
length and that the corporation was independent. 2  The Tax
Court in Ourisman interpreted the first requirement of National
215 Harrison Property Management Co. v. United States, 475 F.2d 623, 627 (Ct. Cl.
1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1130 (1974); see also Vaughn v. United States, 740 F.2d 941,
946 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (corporation would not have entered into agreement if partners had not
owned and controlled it).
26 See, e.g., Jones v. Commissioner, 640 F.2d 745, 754 (5th Cir.) (agency relationship
not proven in absence of showing compensation determined on arms-length basis), cert. de-
nied, 454 U.S. 965 (1981); see Baker & Rotham, supra note 15, at 1300; Bertane, supra note
16, at 763; Hoffman, supra note 13, at 12.
267 730 F.2d 276 (5th Cir. 1984).
208 Id. at 285-86.
269 77 T.C. 263 (1981), rev'd, 708 F.2d 986 (5th Cir. 1983).
27. 82 T.C. 171 (1984), vacated, 760 F.2d 541 (4th Cir. 1985).
2. See Ourisman, 82 T.C. at 184; Roccaforte, 77 T.C. at 286-87.
272 See Ourisman, 82 T.C. at 184; Roccaforte, 77 T.C. at 287-88.
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Carbide as meaning that the corporation must be able to prove its
agent status by evidence other than the control automatically pos-
sessed over their corporation.2 7 3 According to the Tax Court in
Ourisman, the taxpayer must prove that the agency existed inde-
pendently of the shareholders' ownership and control.2 7 4 In neither
case did the Tax Court offer a checklist of factors for proving an
agency relationship. Both cases involved the most common use of a
corporation as agent-the use of a nominee corporation to hold le-
gal title to property while others retain beneficial ownership. In
each case, the court looked at the entire substance of the relation-
ship between the close corporation and its shareholders, and de-
cided that an agency relationship did indeed exist.275
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed Rocca-
forte, the first of these Tax Court opinions.276 Relying on the re-
strictive precedent discussed above, the court declared that the
first "requirement" is indeed mandatory and that the partnership
failed to show any agency attributes in the corporation that did
not arise naturally from ownership and control of the corpora-
tion. In Ourisman, the Tax Court acknowledged this reversal of
Roccaforte by the Fifth Circuit, but opined that the Fifth Circuit
was wrong, and consequently decided that it would not change its
own position.27 8 However, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Cir-
cuit reversed the Tax Court's decision in Ourisman, holding that
273 See Ourisman, 82 T.C. at 186; accord Jones v. Commissioner, 640 F.2d 745, 754 (5th
Cir.) (taxpayer must show relationship independent of acknowledged ownership and con-
trol), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 965 (1981).
24 See Ourisman, 82 T.C. at 186.
275 See id at 184; Roccaforte, 77 T.C. at 287-88.
276 708 F.2d 986, 990 (5th Cir. 1983), rev'g 77 T.C. 263 (1981).
277 Id. at 989-90. Curiously, less than one year after Roccaforte the Fifth Circuit held
that a true agency relationship existed between a partnership and a corporation when a
25% partner operated the corporation and owned all of its shares. See Moncrief v. United
States, 730 F.2d 276, 285-86 (5th Cir. 1984). The Moncrief court seemed to disapprove of
the Roccaforte opinion (none of the judges on the Moncrief panel were on the Roccaforte
panel), noting that the Fifth Circuit forbade a single panel from assessing the correctness of
the Roccaforte opinion. Id. at 282. Moreover, the Moncrief court noted the "tension be-
tween this absolute and mandatory 'factor,'" [i.e., National Carbide's first "requirement"
that the corporation's relations with its principals must not depend upon the fact that it is
owned by the principal] and National Carbide's explicit statement that it did not intend to
"foreclose a true corporate agent ... from handling the property and income of its owner-
principal without being taxable therefor." Id. at 283 (quoting National Carbide, 336 U.S. at
437). The Moncrief court found it unnecessary to resolve that tension because it was clear to
the court that the purported principal, the partnership, was in fact not the owner of the
purported corporate agent. 730 F.2d at 283.
278 See Ourisman, 82 T.C. at 185.
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the Tax Court misconstrued National Carbide. 279 In fact, the
Fourth Circuit relied specifically on the Fifth Circuit's decision in
Roccaforte to overrule the Tax Court's decision in Ourisman. 250
Several lower courts have also adopted the beneficial owner-
ship approach in corporate nominee cases, 281 an approach advo-
cated by various commentators for years.282 Under this approach,
the question is not whether the corporation exists for tax purposes,
or whether it meets the National Carbide test, but instead whether
the corporation is the beneficial owner of the property or is serving
only as nominal titleholder.28 3 In other words, the court should de-
termine who actually owns the property, and attribute the tax con-
sequences for owning the property to that party.28 4 The govern-
ment remains intransigent in declining to accept this argument2""
despite taxpayers' recent successes in the lower courts. 286 As with
the varying interpretations on the agency issue, the ultimate ac-
27 See Ourisman v. Commissioner, 760 F.2d 541, 547-48 (4th Cir. 1985).
280 See id. at 549.
281 See, e.g., Raphan v. United States, 52 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) 83-5987, 5990-91 (Ct. Cl.
1983) (court must determine whether nominal title or actual ownership of property trans-
ferred); Schlosberg v. United States, 47 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) 81-1208, 81-1211 (E.D. Va. 1981)
(transfer for sole purpose of obtaining loans insufficient to divest corporation of "actual
command" over property); Red Carpet Car Wash, Inc. v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 676, 685
(1980) (determinative issue is whether corporation was actual owner of partnership
interest).
282 See, e.g., Bertane, supra note 16, at 762 (taxing income to beneficial owner achieves
desired result by less circuitous route); Miller, supra note 182, at 252 (whether corporation
should be taxed turns on factual determination of whether it is beneficial owner) (quoting
Kurtz & Kopp, supra note 244, at 648); Note, The Use of Corporations, supra note 183, at
367 (focus should be on whether corporation is beneficial owner).
283 Kurtz & Kopp, supra note 244, at 648; see, e.g., Raphan, 52 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) at 83-
5991 (passive holding of title consistent with agent status); Schlosberg, 47 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H)
at 81-1211 (legal and beneficial ownership vested in one with "actual command" over prop-
erty) (citing Griffiths v. Commissioner, 308 U.S. 355, 357 (1939)); Miller, supra note 182, at
251 (focus on whether corporation had substantive law ownership); Note, The Use of Corpo-
rations, supra note 183, at 267-68 (whether admittedly existing corporation should be taxed
on income from property turns on whether beneficial owner or nominal titleholder).
284 See Raphan, 52 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) at 83-5991; Schlosberg, 47 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) at
81-1211; Kurtz & Kopp, supra note 244, at 648; Note, The Use of Corporations, supra note
183, at 367-68.
285 See, e.g., Red Carpet Car Wash, Inc. v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 676, 684 (1980)
(Commissioner urged court not to disregard title in making determination); Raphan, 52
A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) at 83-5991 (despite government's arguments, court focused on actual own-
ership rather than nominal title); Schlosberg, 47 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) at 81-1210-11 (court re-
fused to acknowledged change of ownership as being substantive).
288 See, e.g., Raphan, 52 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) at 83-5993; Schlosberg, 47 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H)
at 81-1210-11 (judgment for taxpayer where conveyance not substantive change of
ownership).
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ceptance or rejection of the beneficial ownership approach depends
on future judicial decisions. The fate of the doctrine is unclear at
this time.
TAX PLANNING RECOMMENDATIONS
The preceding paragraphs discuss the problems encountered
by shareholders in close corporations who wish to avoid the tax
consequences generated by use of the corporate form. The business
purpose/business activity test of Moline virtually ensures defeat to
shareholders who argue that the corporation should be disregarded
completely for tax purposes.287 Several courts recently have ac-
cepted arguments made by taxpayers that corporations holding
real estate are merely agents for the true owners of the property.28
Other courts, however, recently have rejected agency arguments.2 9
Moreover, even if this new lenient attitude on the agency issue
prevails, it would probably be helpful only to real estate ventures.
There is no indication that courts would be willing to treat operat-
ing companies as agents for the shareholders. Furthermore, the
shareholders of many close corporations undoubtedly would be un-
willing to be treated as principals of their corporations, because
they would then lose the cloak of limited liability.290 In light of
these problems, the purpose of this section is to suggest several
alternative planning strategies that might help some close
corporations.
The National Carbide line of cases seems to offer a seldom
287 See Bertane, supra note 16, at 749; Kalb & Lapidus, Nominee Corporations: Legis-
lation is the Only Solution, 5 J. REAL EST. TAx:'N 142, 147 (1977-1978); McEntee, Use of
Controller Corporation in Real Estate Development, 58 TAXEs 520, 521-22 (1980); Note,
The Use of Corporations, supra note 183, at 367.
28 See, e.g., Moncrief v. United States, 730 F.2d 276, 282-85 (5th Cir. 1984) (corpora-
tion holding legal title not entitled to claim losses from property because holding merely as
agent for true owner); Ourisman v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 171, 173 (1984) (facts compelled
finding that corporation acted as shareholder's agent), vacated, 760 F.2d 541 (1985); Rocca-
forte v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 263, 286-88 (1981) (for tax purposes, corporations with legal
title deemed agent of partnership possessing equitable title), rev'd, 708 F.2d 986 (5th Cir.
1983).
28I See, e.g., Vaughn v. United States, 740 F.2d 941, 946-47 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (taxpayer
failed to meet burden of showing true agency relationship); Roccaforte v. Commissioner, 708
F.2d 986, 989-90 (5th Cir. 1983) (taxpayer must show more than agency attributes that flow
from ownership and control); Jones v. Commissioner, 640 F.2d 745, 754-55 (5th Cir.) (tax-
payer failed to carry burden of showing independent arms-length relationship), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 965 (1981).
210 See Note, The Use of Corporations, supra note 183, at 384-85.
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exploited loophole that might work for real estate ventures. Most
close corporations have been unable to overcome the restrictive in-
terpretation of some courts requiring that the shareholders and the
corporation deal with each other at arms-length and that the cor-
poration be independent.2 91 Even if courts ultimately decide to fol-
low this restrictive interpretation of the National Carbide test,
shareholders and their close corporations may be able to achieve
the desired tax objectives by hiring an independent party to run
the agent corporation. An obvious choice to serve as the indepen-
dent party would be an attorney. 92
In Moncrief v. United States,2 9 the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit accepted an agency argument made by taxpayers in
which a minority partner operated the corporate nominee and
owned all of its shares.294 The court emphasized that the purported
principal, the partnership, did not own the stock of the corporate
nominee.295 Moreover, neither the partnership itself nor any of the
other partners "controlled" the minority partner's management of
the nominee corporation, as they could if they were controlling
shareholders of a close corporation. s 6 Hence, the corporation did
not run afoul of National Carbide's first "requirement," that the
corporation's status as agent must not depend on the fact that it is
291 See, e.g., Vaughn v. United States, 740 F.2d 941, 944-47 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (fact that
entities did not deal at arms-length ends need for further inquiry); Jones v. Commissioner,
640 F.2d 745, 755 (5th Cir.) (arms-length dealing crucial factor for taxpayer to demonstrate),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 965 (1981); Harrison Property Management Co. v. United States, 475
F.2d 623, 627 (Ct. Cl. 1973) (if corporation true agent, relations with principal must not
depend on fact that principal owns it), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1130 (1974); Collins v. United
States, 386 F. Supp. 17, 21 (S.D. Ga. 1974) (for finding of corporate agency "its relations
with its principal must not be dependent upon the fact that it is owned by the principal")
(quoting National Carbide, 336 U.S. at 437), aff'd, 514 F.2d 1282 (5th Cir. 1975)(per
curiam).
292 Attorneys are knowledgeable in the formation of corporations and easily can per-
form the ministerial tasks required for modern real estate deals. The attorney can charge a
marketplace fee, which, because the tasks are relatively simple, need not be too large. This
suggested course of conduct is not new, for lawyers typically are entrusted with such
paperwork anyway. Moreover, the shareholders have never truly operated nominee corpora-
tions; their role has been little more than signing whatever documents the attorney advises
them to sign. The government might question the independence of the attorney, but it
would be difficult to argue that the attorney be considered an agent for tax purposes.
Other possible independent parties that might be chosen to run the corporation would
be accountants or bank trust officers.
.93 730 F.2d 276 (5th Cir. 1984).
29 See id. at 284-85.




owned by its principal. 97
If Moncrief is followed in other jurisdictions, excellent tax
planning opportunities will result. If a partnership can find a mi-
nority partner who is not so closely aligned with the majority part-
ners that he would be considered under their control, that partner
could form the agent corporation, take all of its shares, and operate
it without direction from the partnership. A minority partner who
has acted at arms-length with the other partners should suffice.
Because the activities of the corporation would be ministerial only,
this partner would need no real discretion anyway. According to
Moncrief, the partnership would avoid the usual pitfall under the
National Carbide test-failing that first "requirement." The tax-
payers, of course, would need to satisfy the other requirements of
National Carbide, but those requirements are much more easily
met.
If they qualify, shareholders can avoid corporate tax conse-
quences through Subchapter S, which provides the dual benefits of
partnership-like tax consequences and limited liability.298 Prior to
the Subchapter S Revision Act of 1982,299 a corporation did not
qualify for Subchapter S status if its passive income exceeded
twenty percent of its gross receipts.300 This twenty-percent limita-
tion made it especially difficult for real estate ventures, the type of
business most likely to use a corporate nominee, to qualify under
Subchapter S.301 The 1982 Act virtually eliminated the passive in-
come limitation and made a host of other liberal changes in the
law. 0 2 Subchapter S, however, is not a panacea. First, though the
deductions and losses of a Subchapter S corporation flow through
to the shareholders, who can use them on their personal returns,
section 1366(d)(1) sets each shareholder's basis in his stock and in
any indebtedness of the corporation to him as a ceiling on the
amount of deductions and losses that the shareholder can use in
29 See id. at 280-86.
298 See I.R.C. §§ 1361-1379 (1982); supra note 3.
2" Pub. L. No. 97-354, 96 Stat. 1669 (1982).
300 I.R.C. § 1372(e)(5) (1976) (current version at I.R.C. § 1362(d)(3)(A) (1982)).
201 See Crumbley & Dickens, Partnership Taxation for Real Est. Corporations, 13
REAL ESTATE REv. 36, 38 (1983).
302 See I.R.C. § 1362(d)(3) (1982); Crumbley & Dickens, supra note 301, at 38-39;
Kanter, To Elect or Not to Elect Subchapter S - That Is a Question, 60 TAXES 882, 883-84
(1982). The passive income limitation still applies in some instances, such as when a sub-
chapter S corporation previously has accumulated earnings and profits but elects Sub-
chapter C status. See I.R.C. § 1362(d)(3) (1982); Kanter, supra, at 884.
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any taxable year.3° Unlike a partner, who can add his proportion-
ate share of the partnership's liabilities to his basis, an S corpora-
tion is not entitled to add liabilities incurred by the corporation to
his basis in his shares. 4 Because a shareholder's basis in a highly
leveraged real estate venture may be too low to absorb all the cor-
porate deductions and losses, Subchapter S status may be less use-
ful than partnership status for most real estate ventures.30 5 Tax
counsel must pay careful attention to how much of the corporate
deductions and losses the shareholders are likely to be able to use
on their own returns. Even if shareholders cannot use all of those
deductions and losses, however, an S Corporation is apt to be an
improvement over traditional corporation status. The S Corpora-
tion may pass through at least some of their deductions and losses
to the shareholders. Other corporations may not. Second, the 1982
Act did not eliminate all the old irksome requirements of Sub-
chapter S. For example, an S Corporation still cannot have a cor-
poration or a partnership as a shareholder, or have multiple classes
of stock.306
A third alternative is not to incorporate in the first place. Be-
cause proprietorships and partnerships are not independent tax-
paying entities, proprietors and partners are allowed, on their own
personal tax returns, to deduct business losses from income de-
rived from other sources.0 The basic cost in not using the corpo-
rate form is forfeiting limited liability for the investors. This cost
might be too high for some types of businesses. In the case of real
estate ventures, however, limited liability can be achieved by alter-
native means, such as obtaining insurance or using a limited part-
nership.308 If the real estate investors need to borrow funds, how-
ever, they may have no choice but to incorporate, because lenders
may require incorporation to avoid state usury laws.309
303 I.R.C. § 1366(d)(1) (1982).
304 Compare id. § 752(a) (partners' liabilities deductible beyond basis in partnership)
with id. § 1366(d)(1) (shareholders' deductions and losses limited to basis in stock and in-
debtedness); see also Friedman, Choosing Between Corporate and Partnership Entities for
Real Property Depends on its Use, 11 TAX'N FOR LAW. 366, 367-68 (1983) (unlike sub-
chapter S corporation, partners' basis in partnership includes share of liabilities of partner-
ship); Kanter, supra note 302, at 883-84, 912-13, 916-17 (partnership loss limited to adjusted
basis in partnership interest, which includes pro rata share of partnership liabilities).
305 See Friedman, supra note 304, at 367-68; Kanter, supra note 302, at 916-18.
3- I.R.C. § 1361(b)(1) (1982).
307 See id. at § 752 (1982).
308 See 2 F.H. O'NEAL, supra note 24, at § 2.03.
309 See, e.g., Moncrief v. United States, 730 F.2d 276, 278 (5th Cir. 1984) (Texas usury
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DISREGARDING THE CORPORATION AT THE REQUEST OF THE
GOVERNMENT
The government has enjoyed greater success than taxpayers
have in convincing courts to disregard corporate entities for federal
tax purposes.310 The government's higher success ratio stems from
the greater flexibility displayed by courts toward the government.
According to the Supreme Court, the government is not always
"required to acquiesce in the taxpayer's election" of the corporate
form for doing business.311 The government may look at "actuali-
ties" and determine that the corporation is "unreal or a sham,"
and it "may sustain or disregard the effect of the fiction as best
serves the purposes of the tax statute. '312 On the other hand, when
shareholders request courts to disregard their corporation, the
courts frequently admonish that those who choose to incorporate
must live with the tax consequences of their choice.3 13 Thus, the
taxpayer is stuck with his decision to incorporate, regardless of any
unfavorable tax consequences, but the government necessarily is
afforded flexibility to enforce the tax laws. 1 4
When the government urges a court to disregard a corporation
completely for tax purposes, the keystone of the government's case
usually is the business purpose doctrine.3 15 The corporation, the
laws permit lenders to charge corporate borrowers substantially higher rates); Roccaforte v.
Commissioner, 708 F.2d 986, 987 (5th Cir. 1983) (corporations not covered by Louisiana
usury statute which was applicable to partnerships).
110 See, e.g., Interstate Transit Lines v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 590, 596 (1943)(Jack-
son, J., dissenting); Lowndes v. United States, 384 F.2d 635, 638 (4th Cir. 1967) (sustained
government's contention that corporate entity be disregarded); National Investors Corp. v.
Hoey, 144 F.2d 466, 468 (2d Cir. 1944) (Treasury may disregard transactions with corpora-
tions not engaged in business activities); Noonan v. Commissioner, 52 T.C. 907, 910 (1969)
(taxpayer at a disadvantage when attempting to disregard own corporate creation; govern-
ment not similarly burdened), aff'd, 451 F.2d 992 (9th Cir. 1971)(per curiam); Bertane,
supra note 16, at 739-40 (taxpayer at disadvantage when attempting to disregard own cor-
porate creation; government not similarly burdened).
I" Higgins v. Smith, 308 U.S. 473, 477 (1939).
312 Id.; see Bertane, supra note 16, at 739.
" See, e.g., Moline Properties, Inc. v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 436, 439 (1943) (choice
of advantages of incorporation required acceptance of disadvantages); Harrison Property
Management Co. v. United States, 475 F.2d 623, 626 (Ct. Cl. 1973) (stockholders of corpora-
tion cannot demand that it be ignored for federal income tax purposes), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 1130 (1974); Collins v. United States, 386 F. Supp. 17, 19 (S.D. Ga. 1974) (unless corpo-
ration a sham, it cannot be ignored for tax purposes), a/I'd, 514 F.2d 1282 (5th Cir.
1975)(per curiam).
'14 See Comment, Federal Income Taxation and Real Estate Development: Death
Knell for Shell Corporations?, 56 NEB. L. REv. 659, 666-67 (1977).
"' See Moline Properties, Inc. v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 436, 439 (1943); Shaw Constr.
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government typically argues, was formed purely for a tax avoid-
ance purpose.3 16 To be recognized as a separate taxable entity, the
corporation needs to have a business purpose beyond the avoid-
ance of taxation .3 1  Avoiding taxation, the government maintains,
does not count as a business purpose.3' 8 To counter the govern-
ment's argument, the taxpayer typically relies on the Moline busi-
ness purpose/business activity test, with tax counsel attempting to
show either that the shareholders had a business reason for incor-
porating or that the corporation engaged in business activities. 19
Taxpayers sometimes prevail,320 but courts frequently reject the
proposed business justifications for incorporating, especially if ten-
uous and coupled with an obvious tax-avoidance purpose.3 21 Ac-
cording to the business purpose doctrine, however, a tax-avoidance
motive does not destroy the validity of a transaction otherwise mo-
tivated by a nontax purpose.22
Co. v. Commissioner, 323 F.2d 316, 319-20 (9th Cir. 1963); National Investors Corp. v. Hoey,
144 F.2d 466, 468 (2d Cir. 1944).
318 See, e.g., Shaw Constr. Co. v. Commissioner, 323 F.2d 316, 320 (9th Cir. 1963) (gov-
ernment not required to acquiesce in form chosen for doing business if form is unreal);
National Investors Corp. v. Hoey, 144 F.2d 466, 468 (2d Cir. 1944) (purpose of tax statute
best served if sham corporate form is disregarded); Aldon Homes, Inc. v. Commissioner, 33
T.C. 582, 595-96 (1959) (alphabet corporations "tax shams" not formed for legitimate busi-
ness purposes); McEntee, supra note 287, at 521-22 (sham corporation argument employed
by government).
1 See, e.g., Shaw Constr. Co. v. Commissioner, 323 F.2d 316, 320 (9th Cir. 1963) ("es-
caping taxation is not 'business' in the ordinary meaning") (quoting National Investors, 144
F.2d at 468); Aldon Homes, Inc. v. Commissioner, 33 T.C. 582, 597 (1959) (substantive busi-
ness activity required for viable entity does not include escaping taxation).
318 See, e.g., Shaw Constr., 323 F.2d at 320; National Investors, 144 F.2d at 468; Aldon
Homes, 33 T.C. at 597.
310 See, e.g., Britt v. United States, 431 F.2d 227, 231 (5th Cir. 1970) (activities of cor-
poration constituted sufficient amount of business activity); Haberman Farms, Inc. v.
United States, 305 F.2d 787, 788 (8th Cir. 1962) (genuine and valid business purpose in
industry's operation); Aldon Homes, 33 T.C. at 597 (corporation held to be viable business
entity).
310 See, e.g., Britt v. United States, 431 F.2d 227, 237-38 (5th Cir. 1970) (business activ-
ities of corporation compelled recognition of corporation as separate taxable entity); Bass v.
Commissioner, 50 T.C. 595, 602 (1968); Siegel v. Commissioner, 45 T.C. 566, 577 (1966)
(corporate existence cannot be disregarded when "substantial bona fide business reasons"
exist).
32" See, e.g., Shaw Constr., 323 F.2d at 321 (corporation characterized as unreal sham
with no business purpose); Haberman Farms, 305 F.2d at 793 (corporate form no more than
alter ego of taxpayers); National Investors, 144 F.2d at 468 (escaping taxation not business
in ordinary sense of word); Aldon Homes, 33 T.C. at 597 (sham corporation disregarded).
322 See, e.g., United States v. Cumberland Pub. Serv. Co., 338 U.S. 451, 455 (1950) (cor-
poration may liquidate or dissolve without subjecting itself to corporate gains tax even
though primary motive was to avoid brunt of corporate taxation); Master Eagle Assocs., Inc.
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The quintessential example of a corporation formed solely for
a tax avoidance purpose is Gregory v. Helvering,323 a landmark Su-
preme Court case. In Gregory, a sole shareholder in a close corpo-
ration wanted to extract a particular piece of property from her
corporation to sell it to an unrelated third party. 324 She could have
made her corporation distribute it to her as a dividend-in-kind,
but then the full fair market value of the property would have
been ordinary income to her. Consequently, she concocted a plan,
resembling what would now be called a spin-off, which met the lit-
eral statutory requirements for a reorganization. She created a new
corporation, made the old corporation transfer the coveted prop-
erty to the new corporation, liquidated the new corporation, and
distributed the property to herself as part of the liquidation. 325
She then sold the property to the unrelated third party and re-
ported the transaction as a capital gain 26 Though the shareholder
undoubtedly followed the proper state law procedures for incorpo-
rating,327 the second corporation had no business purpose and had
been created for the sole purpose of tax avoidance. The Supreme
Court refused to recognize it for federal tax purposes.32 8
Even when a taxpayer can prove a business purpose for a cor-
poration, or that the corporation engaged in business activity, the
government still may prevail by attacking the participation by the
corporation in a particular transaction rather than its separate
identity as a taxpayer. The government has a formidable array of
common-law tax principles to support this attack. For example,
the government might argue that the corporation's participation in
the particular transaction lacked any purpose other than tax
avoidance 29 The transaction might have been a mere intermedi-
v. United States, 508 F. Supp. 129, 132-33 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (structuring sale of assets to
avoid tax consequences does not alter tax consequences of liquidation transaction); Siegel v.
Commissioner, 45 T.C. 566, 576 (1966) (existence of corporation for tax purposes recognized
if formed for bona fide business purpose).
23 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
324 Id. at 467.
225 Id.
326 Id.
2I Id. at 469-70.
121 Id. at 470.
M See, e.g., Shaw Constr. Co. v. Commissioner, 323 F.2d 316, 321 (9th Cir. 1963) (mul-
tiple corporations were shams serving no real business purposes); Aldon Homes, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 33 T.C. 583, 597 (1959) (corporation organized for sale purpose of avoiding
tax disregarded).
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ary step in a series of transactions begun by the shareholder.330 In-
versely, the corporation might have used its shareholders as mere
conduits to sell its property to outsiders. 331 The corporation may
have shifted the right to collect income to its shareholders,332 or its
shareholders might have shifted the right to collect income to the
corporation.333 Even when the taxpayer has shown a business pur-
pose or activity, the government has urged the application of the
doctrines of step transaction3 3 4 and assignment of income.33 5 The
government might also invoke the old bromide that the court
should place substance over form.336 Additionally, the government
can resort to statutory tax avoidance rules such as those contained
in sections 269131 and 482338 of the Internal Revenue Code.
Commissioner v. Court Holding Co.339 exemplifies the use of
330 See, e.g., Smalley v. Commissioner, 32 T.C.M. (CCH) 373 (1973) (transfer by share-
holder not a sham when done for valid business reasons).
33' Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331, 334 (1945); see, e.g., Stewart v.
Commissioner, 714 F.2d 977, 987-89, 992 (9th Cir. 1983) (affirmed Tax Court's holding that
corporation was mere conduit for appreciated securities); O'Hare v. Commissioner, 641 F.2d
83, 85 (2d Cir.) (shareholder conduit where transfer requirement of loan transaction), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 829 (1981); Waltham Netoco Theatres, Inc. v. Commissioner, 401 F.2d 333,
334-35 (1st Cir. 1968); General Guar. Mortgaging Co. v. Tomlinson, 335 F.2d 518, 520 (5th
Cir. 1964) (substance of transaction, sale by corporation, not to be disguised by formalisms).
332 See, e.g., O'Hare v. Commissioner, 641 F.2d 83, 84-85 (2d Cir.) (stockholder given
title to property but income upon subsequent sale attributable to corporation), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 829 (1981); Williamson v. United States, 292 F.2d 524, 526 (Ct. Cl. 1961) (share-
holder given accounts receivable but income still attributable to corporation).
3' See, e.g., Kimbrell v. Commissioner, 371 F.2d 897, 902 (5th Cir. 1967) (corporation
depository or donee of income).
334 See, e.g., Lowndes v. United States, 384 F.2d 635, 637 (4th Cir. 1967) (government
urged court to disregard transfers as being "mere formalisms").
"' See, e.g., Foglesong v. Commissioner, 621 F.2d 865, 869 (7th Cir. 1980) (assignment
of income doctrine inappropriate where corporation not pure tax avoidance vehicle); Keller
v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 1014, 1021 (1981) (taxpayer's assignment of income set aside when
arbitrary and capricious), aff'd, 723 F.2d 58 (10th Cir. 1983).
336 See, e.g., Stewart v. Commissioner, 714 F.2d 977, 987-89 (9th Cir. 1983) ("substance
over form" case arises when transaction structured to satisfy formal code requirements to
minimize tax liability); Commissioner v. Sansome, 60 F.2d 931, 933 (2d Cir.) (courts seek
recourse in vague "form" and "substance" alternative), cert. denied, 287 U.S. 667 (1932).
--7 I.R.C. § 269A (1982); see, e.g., Siegel v. Commissioner, 45 T.C. 566, 577-78 (1966)
(government's reliance on § 264 held untenable).
-- I.R.C. § 482 (1982); see, e.g., Foglesong v. Commissioner, 691 F.2d 848, 850 (7th Cir.
1982) (section 482 held inapplicable); Keller v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 1014, 1021-22 (1981)
(section 482 prevented evasion of taxes), aff'd, 723 F.2d 58 (10th Cir. 1983); see also B.
BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 96, 1 3.17, at 3-66 (section 482 permits reallocation to
"clearly reflect income"); Berger, Gilman & Stapleton, Section 482 and the Nonrecognition
Provisions: An Analysis of the Boundary Lines, 26 TAx LAW 523, 527-31 (1973) (section 482
may override any specific code provision with which it comes into conflict).
339 324 U.S. 331 (1945).
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virtually all of these common-law tax principles to recast the terms
of a particular transaction. In Court Holding, a corporation agreed
to sell its sole asset to an unrelated third party.3 40 At the first
scheduled closing, the corporation's attorney instructed the corpo-
ration not to execute the closing documents because the sale would
have resulted in a large taxable gain to the corporation.3 4 1 At the
direction of the attorney, the parties reconvened the next day,
when the corporation distributed the asset to the shareholders in a
liquidation, and they in turn sold the asset to the unrelated third
party.342 According to the revised structure of transaction, the only
recognized gain was that of the shareholders for receipt of the liq-
uidating distribution. (The sale to the third party was a taxable
event, but the amount realized matched the shareholders' basis).
The Supreme Court used the substance-over-form and step-trans-
action doctrines, along with agency principles, to recast the sale as
one made by the corporation with its shareholders acting as its
agent.343 Because the corporation was deemed to be the seller, it
had to recognize a taxable gain on the sale. 44
One final incidence of disregarding the corporate entity is wor-
thy of note. Close corporations are notoriously undercapitalized.
They often own insufficient assets with which to pay a final judg-
ment. 45 Consequently, when the government has reduced a claim
for taxes to a final judgment, it sometimes encounters difficulties
in collecting on its judgment. As would any other judgment credi-
tor in such circumstances, the government is likely to request the
court to "pierce the corporate veil," that is, to make the sharehold-
ers personally liable. 46 The arguments and issues in these cases
30 Id. at 332-33.
341 Id. at 333.
342 Id.
3,3 Id. at 334.
344 Id.
31 See, e.g., DeWitt Truck Brokers, Inc. v. W. Ray Flemming Fruit Co., 540 F.2d 681,
685 (4th Cir. 1976) (in applying "instrumentality" or "alter ego" doctrine, courts consider
extent of undercapitalization); United States v. Healthwin-Midtown Convalescent Hosp.
and Rehabilitation Center, 511 F. Supp. 416, 418-19 (C.D. Cal. 1981) (in determining
whether to pierce corporate veil, courts consider inadequacy of capitalization), afl'd mem.,
685 F.2d 448 (9th Cir. 1982); Mull v. Colt Co., 31 F.R.D. 154, 163 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) ("obvious
inadequacy of capital... has frequently been an important factor in cases denying stock-
holders their defense of limited liability") (quoting Luckenbach S.S. Co. v. W.B. Grace &
Co., 267 F. 676, 681 (4th Cir. 1920)); Minton v. Cavaney, 56 Cal. 2d 576, 580-81, 364 P.2d
473, 475, 15 Cal. Rptr. 641, 643 (1961) (if corporate entity not disregarded for inadequate
capitalization, inequitable results follow).
"I See, e.g., Kalb v. United States, 505 F.2d 506, 508 (2d Cir. 1974) (government sought
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closely track common-law principles developed in state courts. 47
CONCLUSION
Although corporations and other business organizations each
have certain clearly defined characteristics, the line of demarcation
often blurs when attempting to define corporations for federal tax
purposes. The Internal Revenue Code and the Kintner Regulations
promulgated thereunder offer little guidance, particularly in classi-
fying borderline cases. State law is of no additional value, even
when federal tax regulations permit the state to have a voice in
classification.
Amidst these murky waters, the owners of closely held busi-
ness enterprises struggle to have their corporations considered or
not considered distinct taxable entities. In addition to the two
traditional and evolving arguments that the corporation should be
disregarded under Moline Properties, or that the corporation is a
mere agent or nominee under National Carbide, taxpayers are tak-
ing advantage of the emerging doctrine of beneficial ownership or
turning to S Corporation status. The government is not unarmed,
however, and has itself successfully used numerous doctrines to
convince courts to disregard corporate entities. The growing
strength of the government's arguments for disregarding corporate
entities is particularly evident when courts recognize undercapital-
ization as a means of "piercing the corporate veil."
to hold shareholders personally liable for unpaid taxes), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 979 (1975);
Bloom v. United States, 272 F.2d 215, 218-19 (9th Cir. 1959) (officer-shareholder sued per-
sonally for delinquent taxes), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 803 (1960).
311 See H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra note 122, at § 147; F.H. O'NEAL, supra note 24,
at § 1.09.
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